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The controversy revolving around Congressional consideration of the
"Nixon Trade Act of 1969" once again drew the nation's attention to our
foreign trade policy. With the eventual shelving of the "Trade Act of 1970"
(the same bill after months of testimony, heated debate, and many revisions)
by the Senate just prior to the close of the 91st Congress, interest in foreign
trade temporarily cooled, but has not been extinguished. Recently, the
Japanese textile industry agreed to limit their total exports of cotton, wool,
and synthetic fiber products to the United States to the 1969 level, with a
stipulated 5 per cent growth factor the first succeeding year and 6 per cent
the following two years. These agreements were reached privately with
Chairman Wilbur D. Mills (D-Ark. ) of the prestigious and powerful House
Ways and Means Committee. President Nixon flatly refused to accept these
self-imposed restrictions, stating concern for the southern textile industry
as the reason, but instead threatened to invoke either the national security

clause of the Trade Agreements Act, or the escape clause of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in order to reduce Japanese textile imports.
In the meantime, Chairman Mills has reintroduced the trade bill to the
92nd Congress. It is just a matter of time before it comes to the floor and
is once again the subject of heated partisan debate- -a debate that has been
raging in this country since 1786, or before- -that of "free trade" vs
"protectionism. "
Foreign trade has always been a primary issue in this nation's
commercial policies. Indeed, the second statute adopted by the first
Congress was a tariff act. Every President and every Congress, particularly
in modern times, has had to concern themselves with some aspect of foreign
trade. And since we have been predominantly an exporting nation since 1874,
we have generally supported the theories of free trade. Of course there are
always those, oftentimes a majority, who oppose freer trade for specific
reasons, usually economic such as protection for one particular industry,
e.g., the textile industry, or for maintenance of a particular expertise in
the interests of national security.
Since 1934, when the very liberal and far-reaching Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act was made law, it has generally been held that United States'
foreign trade policy has been a liberal one. No general tariff acts have been
passed, as they were in 1909, 1913, 1921, 1922, and 1930, although specific
tariffs or other restrictions have been enacted. Each President has professed
his belief in, and support for, an expanded world trade and all of our leading

economists have taught us that "comparative advantage" will work best for
us if it is practiced world-wide and liberally. Indeed, it has been written,
and nearly come to be an accepted article of faith, that the United States is
the world leader in the advocacy and practice of free trade.
A little reflection, however, will tell us that we still have tariffs; we
still debate over the damage done to domestic industry by foreign imports;
we still have laws against certain countries' products. If free trade is so
good, and is so universally liked, why do we have restrictions at all?
That foreign trade is an economic subject there can be no doubt. It is
that, and it is also a financial subject, a marketing subject, a geographical
subject, and a logistics subject. But it is also something more- -it is a
political subject as well. And politics, more often than those other
disciplines, control the direction and determine the policy for foreign trade.
It has not been recorded that the dramatic appeal made by a thousand
leading economists to Mr. Hoover in 1930, asking him to veto the Smoot-
Hawley Bill, caused that gentleman to hesitate before approving the bill.
Without the least desire to belittle the labors of scholars who have studied
consequences of the protective tariff policy, I make bold to express the
opinion that these studies have neglected an important phase of the subject.
The tariff is not an economic question exclusively. It is a political
problem as well. *
Objectives
This paper will examine, in broad terms, United States' foreign trade
policies since the end of World War II.
E. E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures and the Tariff (Hamden,
Connecticut: Archon Books, 1963), p. vii.

Subsidiary objectives are:
to analyze announced foreign trade policies of Presidents
Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon;
to examine major federal legislation dealing with foreign trade
policies since World War II;
to enumerate the size and trends of United States' foreign
merchandise trade, particularly imports, from 1945 through 1970;
to review this country's major barriers to trade, tariff and non-
tariff, with respect to size and trends; and
to discern trade patterns and programs with the larger trading
blocs of the past twenty-five years.
The primary objective is:
o to determine if the economic and trade implications of United
States' policies, from 1945 through 1970, as contained in Presidential
programs and legislative acts, have been those of "free trade" or have
veered toward "protectionism. "
Research Question
The goal of this paper will be to answer the following primary research
question:
9 Has the United States, since the end of World War II, pursued a
"free trade" policy as exclusively and as vigorously as is generally believed?

Subsidiary questions contributing toward the answer of the primary
question are:
What was the United States' position at the end of World War II
with respect to tariffs and other trade barriers?
What have the five administrations in power since 1945 professed
their trade policies to be?
What major legislation and international agreements have shaped
U.S. foreign trade policy since 1945?
What progress has been made in the reduction of tariffs and other
barriers ?
What, if any, major trade partners have influenced our trade
policies, and in what respect? and,
What have the economics of our foreign trade been?
Definitions
Throughout this paper several terms will be used over and over again;
therefore, to insure precise interpretation of their meaning the following
definitions are given. The statements specify what the term is and how it will
be used for the purposes of this analysis. Any other interpretation, and un-
o
doubtedly there are many, is invalid for the objectives pursued in this study.
2
Information for the definitions presented was derived from: Frank
Henius, Dictionary of Foreign Trade (2nd Ed; New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
,
1947) and U.S., Department of Commerce, Guide to Foreign Trade Statistics :
1970 (Washington, D. C. : U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, 1970).

concession a commitment, arrived at by
reciprocal trade negotiations, by one trading partner to another to not
impose trade restrictions on a given product higher than that agreed
upon in the negotiations. The concession may take several forms: the
binding of the present tariff rate, the binding of duty-free status, the
reduction of the tariff rate, the removal or increase of existing quotas,
liberalization of foreign exchange controls, removal or lessening of
restrictive customs regulations, etc.
exports merchandise leaving the U.S. customs
area, without regard to the method of financing, and without regard to
whether or not the exportation takes place in connection with a
commercial transaction, excluding shipments between the U.S. and
Puerto Rico and the U.S. and its outlying possessions, shipments to
the U.S. armed forces for their own use, shipments in transit through
the U.S. from one foreign country to another, gold and silver bullion,
electrical energy, household and personal effects, and, most
importantly, re-exports of foreign merchandise originally imported but
not enhanced further in value.
foreign trade the exchange of merchandise between
countries.
free trade the exchange between countries on the
basis of a tariff system that does not distinguish between articles
produced domestically and articles produced abroad and consequently

either taxing both (by the duties or taxes imposed upon them) on an
equal basis and to an equal extent or exempting both from all taxation
(or payment of duties).
imports those entries of merchandise into the
U.S. customs area (the fifty states, District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico) for immediate consumption and the withdrawal from warehouses
for consumption (in other terms, "imports for consumption") without
regard to whether the importation involves a commercial transaction,
which therefore reflect the total of commodities entered into U.S.
consumption channels, and excluding entries into warehouses.
merchandise imports and exports
. .
from the importer's and customs
point-of-view "merchandise" represents and includes goods, wares,
and chattels of every description capable of being imported, except
household and personal effects and other articles which are exempt
from duty.
protectionism the system or policy adopted for
protection (from competition from foreign sources or by foreign
shippers) of native goods or materials. Duties are established on
imports of foreign goods of a similar nature or character, thereby
making competition by foreign shippers difficult or impossible. It is,
therefore, a tariff policy for the protection of home industries or
production and can also be made possible by embargoes or bounties.

Limitations
"No satisfactory method has yet been devised for measuring with any
degree of precision the restrictive effects of tariffs and other barriers to the
3
international movement of goods. " So stated Howard Piquet, the noted
authority on tariffs and trade.
Because of the nature, scope, and time factors of this subject, this
analysis can be neither exhaustive nor all inclusive. At best, it can deal
only in broad generalities. Detailed analysis of each piece of trade legisla-
tion and of each round of trade agreement negotiations is not an objective.
Rather, how the conclusions reached, agreements made, and laws passed,
fit into the general pattern of policy pursuit is the theme. Further, in an
analysis of this type, many proposals that never reached final passage are
encountered. These will not be considered except where pertinent to the
expression of policy that was eventually adopted or of a program which may
have been enacted piecemeal. In general, only programs and legislation that
were in fact enacted will be considered. Otherwise, a many volume work
would be insufficient to contain the facts.
One of the most important distinctions that must be made is precisely
what is meant by "foreign trade. " The possible inclusions in the term are so
broad that even within the outline described above, specific limitations on the
scope of a study in that field must be made. The term can include
3Howard S. Piquet, Aid, Trade, and the Tariff (New York: Thomas Y.
Crow ell Company, 1953), p. 11.

international monetary transactions, military assistance, foreign aid
programs, foreign commercial investments or foreign exchange programs.
This paper however, is concerned only with merchandise imports and
exports --that portion of the national income accounts equation usually
expressed as (X - M).
When quantitatively comparing a nation's foreign trade from year to
year several problems arise, including inflation and the changing nature of
articles traded. Therefore, specific comparisons between, for example,
1945 and 1970, must be used with caution. Money values will be in current
(yearly) prices. The purpose of such aggregate statistics will be to provide
gross comparisons, trend indicators and economic reference points. They
are not to be construed as absolute indications of comparative trade levels.
This country's foreign trade will not be compared with any other
country's in this paper. Such comparisons have inherent in them the same
hazards as chronological comparisons, and also several more. Different
countries use different statistical methods, quantify commodities differently,
or simply have so many complicated and varied differences in their monetary
and commercial systems, that comparisons with this country would require
voluminous conversions and explanations. Further, the purpose of the
paper, as stated, is to examine what has been done here- -not whether or not
we have done more than someone else.
Finally, no specific tariffs or commodities will be examined in detail.
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Several examples will be cited in the course of illustrating various points,
but the purpose of such examples will be to demonstrate various policies or
trends. Detailed comparisons of restrictions on the trade of one item with
respect to another would serve no purpose in an examination of overall
policies and programs.
Sources of Data
The data used were obtained primarily from the U.S. Tariff
Commission Library, but secondary locations were other libraries in the
Washington, D. C. area, i.e., The George Washington University Library,
the D. C. Public Library and the Army Library in the Pentagon. Sources
were published materials, Congressional hearings and analyses, and to a
great extent, U.S. Department of Commerce statistics. No personal
interviews or primary research were conducted because of the conviction
that policies and programs can best be analyzed in perspective by published
results of what actually has happened.
Methodology
This is an "historical research paper. " That is, the trade policies of
this nation since 1945, as demonstrated by executive program and federal
legislation, will be examined in historical perspective. The formulation of
policies by the Presidents and the Congress, and their economic and trade
results, will be traced, touching back to 1934, but essentially beginning in
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detail from 1945, to analyze the trend and seek out the essential character
of the results. Specific statistics will be presented and used to demonstrate
aggregate trade levels, and from these statistics inferences can be drawn
which support or belie the policy pronouncements. But these statistics are
only an adjunct to provide a quantitative measure of the results of trade
policies. The essential analysis is the synthesis of twenty-five years of
policy and program. From that synthesis will be drawn a conclusion-
-
"free trade" or "protectionism." The final conclusion will be one of
subjective weighing of what has been, with that elusive quantity, what might
have been.
The analysis will be inductive.
Order and Nature of Presentation
This paper has been divided into four substantive chapters, plus
introductory and concluding chapters. The material and data utilized
separated naturally into four categories, and research was conducted on
one of those categories, the material for one chapter, at a time. Within
each of those categories, the material was pursued, and has been presented,
in chronological order. The rationalization behind this course was that
historical research can best be carried out chronologically.
The four substantive chapters are: As World War II Ended,
Presidential Programs and Legislative Actions, The Trade Agreements
Program and Trading Partners and Trade Levels.
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Thus, this paper will trace this country's foreign trade policies and
results from our position immediately following World War II, through six
rounds of GATT negotiations and the development of trade with the other
major trading blocs of the world, e. g. , Japan and the EEC. It will contrast
known trade results with those trade programs and policy pronouncements
that our leaders have made. The conclusions reached will be a synthesis of
those comparisons, arrived at with subjective analysis.
Appendix A
Throughout this paper reference will be made to import and export
aggregates, average tariff values, and other statistics related to our
foreign trade. In the interests of brevity and of readibility, Appendix A
is offered. Many statistical references will be taken from this table.
Footnotes will not be used to identify such statistics, but where a number is
taken from another source, or when a figure is in disagreement with the
table, an appropriate notation will be made.

CHAPTER II




ought not to be followed as a business . . . . " wrote
Machiavelli early in the sixteenth century. His words rang true even in
mid-twentieth century, for the world's business faltered and nearly collapsed
during World War II. All normal channels of trade were broken or altered
to meet the requirements of insatiable war machines. All the countries,
particularly the principals, among which the United States was primary,
. . .
engaged in economic warfare as a supplement to military warfare:
we bought goods that we didn't need to keep our enemies from getting
them; we supplied goods to other countries to obtain from them the things
we did need and to insure ourselves of their support; we denied goods to
other countries to penalize them for not cooperating with us and to prevent
them from aiding our enemies. *
The majority of all goods traded was for military purposes. International
trade became an instrument for, and an instrument of, war.
Only the United States, of all the industrial giants of the pre-war world,
1 Clair Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade (New York: The Macmillan




remained unscathed. Our industrial prevalence and economic dominance
soared to unprecedented levels and were omnipresent. One-third of the
world's exports emanated from these shores, and one-tenth of the imports
arrived here. More startling, however, is the fact that fully one-half of
the world's output of manufactured goods was produced by the United States.
For obvious reasons, exports exceeded imports, $10,309 billion to $4,098
billion. This lack of balance was reflected in every category of goods, as
well as services. "We were in the position of selling everything to every-
body and buying too little of anything from anybody, of being creditor to all
and debtor to none.
The imminent results of this chaotic, topsy-turvy situation were
predictable. Importing nations around the globe acted eventually to increase
restrictions on imports and enacted tariffs on all but essential survival items.
Although 1945 and 1946 saw a general lifting of wartime restrictions and the
welcoming of needed foodstuffs and fuels, 1947 ushered in a general reversal
as nation after nation realized its own industry was struggling to revive and
survive in the face of staggering imports, particularly from the United States.
3
Also, the imbalance in financial positions became alarming. A long series
of import restrictions followed, and, as the world's exporter, the United
2Ibid.
, p. 10.
^Henry Chalmers, World Trade Policies: the Changing Panorama
,




States was the most severly affected. An additional factor influencing world
trade patterns was the rising demand of Americans for foreign produced
goods. The restrictions of the war years whetted the appetites of Americans,
and when foreign products were introduced to the marketplace, they were
snapped up. The result of these coincident happenings was a sharp
decrease in exports and a rise in imports in 1948.
Throughout this hectic postwar period however, the Truman Adminis-
tration, and other trade dependent nations, were conducting conversations
and, eventually, negotiations around a farsighted and optimistic ideal: the
International Trade Organization (ITO). The proposals that culminated in
these discussions had their initiation in 1941 as a result of Anglo-American
talks. In 1943 the proposals were submitted to other nations, and in
December 1945, the United States invited several other governments to
partake in negotiations beginning in 1947. As a result of certain initiatives
by the United Nations, these proposals were eventually formed into a
"Suggested Charter for an Interantional Trade Organization of the United
Nations." An outgrowth of the international conference called to formulate
4John Parke Young, The International Economy (New York: The Ronald
Press Company, 1951), p. 45.
5
ITO was one of three organizations envisioned as restructuring post-
war international economics, and at the same time avoiding the horrors of
the post-WWI era. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) --more commonly known as The World Bank--and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) faired better than ITO and have been operating since
1946 and 1947 respectively.
Wilcox, Charter for World Trade, pp. 37-50.
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ITO was the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
by twenty-three nations at Geneva in August 1947. The "Charter, " and with
it ITO, suffered a fate common to many far-reaching and idealistic proposals.
While it was signed by fifty-three nations at Havana in March 1948, it was




The "Smoot-Hawley" Tariff Act of 1930 raised tariffs on imports into
the United States to their highest level in history. Duties on dutiable imports
amounted to 59 per cent of value in 1932, and imports were a mere $1. 3
billion, compared to $1. 6 billion in exports, both levels lower than they had
o
been since prior to 1910. Even today the majority of tariff legislation in
effect still stems from the Tariff Act of 1930. The "protectionists" were
very strongly in control during the first third of the century, and with the
onset of the depression it appeared as though they would enforce even
harsher restrictions.
The Roosevelt Administration, led by Secretary of State Cordell Hull,
sought to reverse this policy and to open the gates of international trade.
7 Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964 :
A Review of Government and Politics in the Postwar Years (Washington, D. C,





Secretary Hull proposed that Congress delegate some of its Constitutional
power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations" to the President by
permitting him to negotiate with other nations tariffs and certain other
import restrictions. He proposed that any reductions of restrictions or
tariffs resulting from these negotiations would be accomplished by reciprocal
executive agreements, and that these agreements, unlike tariffs or
commercial treaties, would not need Senate ratification. Of course the
"protectionists, " particularly the Republicans in Congress, fought the
proposal but the persuasion of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, and
the power of the Democratic Congress, resulted in the passage of the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934.
This Act is a milestone in foreign trade legislation, and it is the
foundation, in America as well as the rest of the "free world, " upon which
free trade advocates have built their case since. It completely changed the
complexion of this nation's tariff policy. Reciprocal, rather than unilateral,
reductions were to be the vehicle by which tariffs would be lowered. They
were to be bargained down. Further, reductions would be extended to other
nations by liberal interpretation of the "most-favored-nation" principle.
The Act stated that concessions resulting from negotiations and mutual
agreements should also be granted all foreign countries, provided only that
they did not discriminate against American trade. In more specific terms,
the Act authorized the President:




2. To proclaim such modifications of existing duties or other import
restrictions, or such additional import restrictions or such continuance,
and for such minimum periods of existing customs or excise treatment of
any article as might be appropriate to carry out the agreements made.
The authority of the President was limited by a requirement that no
duties could be increased or decreased by more than 50 per cent of any
existing rate of duty and that no article could be transferred between the
dutiable and the free lists. Every agreement under the act could be
terminated three years after entry into force. 'If not then terminated'
they were 'subject to termination thereafter upon not more than six
months' notice. ' In other words, if not so denounced they were to continue
indefinitely.
The act provided that new agreed duties should 'apply to articles, the
growth, produce, or manufacture of all foreign countries, whether
imported directly or indirectly, ' except in cases of countries that dis-
criminated agains the United States. Specific exception was made of the
Cuban-American preferences that had existed since 1902, but otherwise
the act itself incorporated the principle of unconditional most-favored-
nation treatment.
The act was not drawn on free trade principles, and there was no
reference to the classical doctrine of comparative advantage. The
authority it granted was 'for the purpose of expanding the foreign markets
of the United States. ' There was no specific mention of the interests of
the consumer, although this subject was prominently discussed in both
congressional and public debates. But in terms of the act itself, the
President had to find before taking action that existing duties or other
import restrictions of the United States or any foreign country were unduly
burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the United States, and he
was to exercise his authority 'by regulating the admission of foreign goods
into the United States in accordance with the characteristics and needs of
various branches of American production so the foreign markets (would)
be made available to those branches of American production which
require(d) and (were) capable of developing such outlets. ' Before entering
into any trade agreement the President was required to 'seek information
and advice with respect thereto from the United States Tariff Commission,
the departments of State, Agriculture, and Commerce and from such
other sources as he (might) deem appropriate and in each case to give
reasonable notice of intention to negotiate so that any interested person
might have opportunity to present his views. *
Prior to 1945 the Act was extended three times without amendment; in
gWilliam Adams Brown, Jr., The United States and the Restoration




1937 and 1940 for periods of three years, and in 1943 for a two year
increment. The Act became the vehicle whereby America had at long last
reversed its historical policy of higher and higher protective tariffs, and it
opened the door for meaningful progress toward true world-wide free
enterprise, competition, large-scale multilateral trade and improved living
conditions for all mankind.
The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1945
Shortly before his death, President Roosevelt urged Congress to
extend the 1934 Act once more, but in addition to provde extended tariff
reducing powers. Most of the reductions authorized by the Act had been
exhausted and imports had increased from $1. 636 billion in 1934 to $4. 098
billion in 1945. After President Roosevelt's death the Truman Administra-
tion continued to seek the additional authority.
Opposition to the extension was growing in both houses of Congress.
Part of this was due to the growing strength of the Republicans in Congress,
and part was due to the feeling of many Congressmen that as long as we
were at war an extension of over one year was dangerous. Debate was
heated and long, particularly in the House. At one point, when the bill
was in the House, President Truman sent a letter to Speaker Rayburn in
which he referred to the bill as "the first order of importance for the success
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of my Administration. " The Act was passed and contained the requested
expansion of tariff cutting authority. The President was permitted to reduce
tariff rates by not more than 50 per cent of the rate in effect on January 1,
1945. Thus, if a tariff had been reduced under the authority of the 1934 Act
to 50 per cent of its 1934 rate, it could be further reduced to 25 per cent of
that rate. A rate that had been unchanged since 1934 could be reduced by
half. In addition, the 1945 Act added the War and Navy departments to the
agencies that must be consulted by the President prior to tariff changes.
Non-Tariff Restrictions
Tariffs, the subject of the majority of trade discussion, legislation,
and interest, constitute only one form of trade barrier. In the United States
tariffs have always played the major role in trade restrictions, but even if
tariffs were to be reduced to some ideal minimum, or eliminated entirely,
it would represent only the first phase of an effective program to encourage
expanded world trade. "Indeed, the complete elimination of tariffs would
encourage the proliferation of a wide variety of the more subtle import
barriers which bear the tag 'non-tariff. '"^
Asher Isaacs, International Trade: Tariff and Commercial Policies
(Chicago, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1948), p. 277.
nMark S. Massel, "Non-Tariff Barriers As An Obstacle to World
Trade, " The Brookings Institution, A report of a conference held under the
auspices of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law on
July 10-12, 1964, at Ditchley Park, Enstone, Oxfordshire (Washington, D. C.
The Brookings Institution, 1965), p. 61.
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Non-tariff barriers can generally be divided into "quantitative
restrictions" and an amorphorous category labeled "others. " The
quantitative restrictions are of three varieties: embargoes, quotas, and
tariff-rate quotas (those tariffs which carry with them quantitative quotas,
above which the tariff rate is substantially increased). These categories do
not, however, include restrictions of U.S. imports attributable to controls
unilaterally imposed by supplying countries.
The "other" category of restrictions can include:
Customs Administration
Even though a country may maintain a schedule of low tariffs, its
customs administration may provide barriers that are more difficult to
surmount than the formal tariffs may indicate. For example, some
American ad valorem tariffs are based on the United States selling prices
rather than the prices paid by the importer. As a result, the duties paid
may be considerably higher than the formal tariff schedule. . . . Other
obstacles may be found in the procedure for setting customs classifications.
Administration of Anti-Dumping Laws
If a complaint has been issued charging that an import was made at
unfair low prices, the resulting administrative procedures may, in them-
selves, set obstacles in the way of international commerce. Even when
the allegation is registered, the procedures may be prohibitively expensive
for the exporter.
Protection of Industrial Property
In addition to the conventional operation of patent and trade-mark laws,
such countries as the United States permit the domestic producer to
institute a procedure in 'unfair competition 1 in order to obtain a decree
denying entry of patented products or goods made by patented processes . .
Health and Safety Rules
Great variety in the minimum standards employed in different
countries may compel a producer to comply with so many diverse
regulations that it curtails his export opportunities. Administrative
requirements may make it tedious and expensive to export. . . .
Labelling Requirements





When a government purchases from its own nationals exclusively, it
clearly restrains the free movement of goods across its borders.
Similarly, if it awards research and development contracts to its own
citizens exclusively, it gives those nationals strong, often unassailable,
positions as future suppliers.
Subsidies
When subsidy is paid to domestic suppliers, it may block imports as
effectively as a tariff. Conversely, when a subsidy is paid on exported
goods, the exporter has a competitive advantage, and the subsidy may
invite other countries to retaliate with new trade bars.
Compulsory Preferences
A number of methods are employed to compel the use of domestic
products in addition to outright quotas and embargoes. For example,
some mixing regulations provide that a minimum percentage of home-
grown wheat must be used in grinding flour.
Taxes
. . .
Turnover taxes may take a larger tool from imported goods; tax
rebates on exports may induce other countries to take countervailing
measures, such as off-setting levies on imports; graduated taxes may
penalize foreign goods; differential tariffs, charging the higher rate on
goods which the domestic industry can produce. . . .
Import Permits
. . . can be used as a flexible valve. In some countries import permits
are issued on the recommendation of committees of domestic companies
in the related industry.
Export Controls
A nation may have grounds for believing that new barriers will be
executed against its goods if its exports to another country are too high.
Restrictive Business Practices
When all else fails to blunt the edge of international competition, a
number of techniques may be applied by private industry. Transnational
agreements may assign markets of certain countries to specific manu-
facturer's exclusively. Similar results can be obtained through domestic
trade boycotts.
Immediately after the war, but not including remaining wartime
restrictions, quantitative barriers imposed by legislative act were applied to
12Massel, "Non-Tariff Barriers, " pp. 61-67.
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a wide range of goods including some agricultural products (cotton, wheat,
etc. ), animals for livestock, non-migratory birds, salmon, and of course
obscene materials, narcotics and the like. Quotas arrived at by agreement
with other nations included furs, coffee, and sugar; and tariff-rate quotas
covered over a dozen other items such as cattle, fish, watches, cigars, etc.
13Separate legislation covered trade with the Philippines. Exports were
restricted on many of the same products that had import restrictions placed
upon them, and on products restricted in quantity by this country in return
for voluntary restrictions by other nations. Other restrictions in effect at
the time, of course, are impossible to measure or even estimate, but it is
probably valid to assume that they did not constitute a major impediment
to trade immediately after the war. With the signing of GATT in 1947,
quantitative restrictions were prohibited (Article XI) except under certain
circumstances.
An Era of Hope
As the war ended, all logical indices pointed toward a bright future in
the field of international trade. The year 1945 witnessed the passage of the
most liberal trade agreements act yet, and the lifting of most of the wartime
restrictions. Imports into the United States were valued at $4. 098 billion,
1
3
Howard S. Piquet, "Quantitative Restrictions on Foreign Trade
Imposed by the United States, rr Legislative Reference Service, Library of
Congress (Washington, D. C. : Library of Congress, 1947), pp. 1-3.
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an all time high, and only 32.9 per cent of those were dutiable, an all time
low. The ratio of duties collected to ad valorem dutiable imports was also
14
at its lowest, 29 per cent. This trend, coupled with a definitely free
trade administration and Congress in power, and a rising demand by
Americans for foreign produced goods indicated that free trade was, perhaps,
at last a real possibility. What has happened in the intervening years, 1945
to 1970, will be pursued in the following chapters.
Osward Garrison Villard, Free Trade-Free World (New York:
Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1947), pp. 42-44; and, Congressional
Quarterly Service, Congress and the Nation: 1945-1964, p. 187.

CHAPTER III
PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Truman- -Trade Expansion
In a speech he made in Dallas, Texas well after his presidency,
Harry Truman said:
... it is certainly a historical fact and not a matter for partisan debate
that the Democratic party has always opposed high tariffs, and favored
the expansion of international trade. This position has been taken not out
of any perverse idealism, but simply on the ground that it is good for the
country. *
His memoirs are laced with similar protestations of his belief in free trade.
For example: "The lesson in history, I said, was plain: Freedom of
international trade would provide the atmosphere necessary to the preserva-
tion of peace. "2 He was destined to struggle mightily with a Republican, and
in many respects "protectionist, " 80th Congress (1947-1948) but managed to
fend off anti-trade legislation, in some instances by use of the veto, and to
X Harry S. Truman, "The Free World and Free Trade, " The JNO. E.
OWENS Memorial Lecture, 1957 (Dallas, Texas: Southern Methodist Uni-
versity Press, 1963), p. 6.
2Harry S. Truman, Memoirs
, Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. 2




see some of the most significant foreign trade legislation ever passed come
to fruition during his administration.
As mentioned in Chapter II, negotiations were being conducted
concerning the establishment of an International Trade Organization during
1947 and 1948. These negotiations led to the signing of GATT, the bedrock
of international tariff reduction, which will be discussed in Chapter IV. It
is important to realize, however, that the agreements initially covered
over half the existing world trade. In addition, the Truman Administration,
recognizing the desparate situation of Great Britain and Europe, initiated
the series of aid agreements and loans which eventually constituted "The
Marshall Plan, " named after General George C. Marshall, Truman's
Secretary of State (1947-1948) and Secretary of Defense (1950-1951). Since
those programs more appropriately fall under the heading of "foreign aid"
rather that "foreign trade" they will not be discussed in detail in this paper.
It is significant, however, that the Truman Administration was active on
many fronts in an effort to reorganize, revitalize, and realize foreign
trade.
In 1946, Congress passed the Philippine Trade Act, designed to
govern trade with the islands for the next twenty years. This law provided
duty free entry of U. S. and Philippine products to the o,ther country until
1954 when tariff rates of each country would begin to be applied, rising to
the full rate by 1974. It also established quotas on sugar, cordage, rice,
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cigars, tobacco, coconut oil and buttons, and authorized the President to
3
establish other quotas as he deemed necessary.
The Republican Congress of 1947-1948 caused President Truman great
frustration in many areas, but foreign trade was one of the worst. With the
ITO negotiations in progress in Geneva, Congress urged the President to
initiate several steps designed to limit future trade liberalizations. By
Executive Order, Truman approved two such recommendations: inclusion
of an "escape clause" (the provision to withdraw or modify tariff concessions
on particular goods if increased imports of such goods cause serious injury
to domestic industries producing those goods) in all future agreements and
the requirement for the Tariff Commission to investigate complaints of
4injury to an industry caused by imported goods. The escape clause was
to be a controversial issue in foreign trade legislation for many years to
come.
The forthcoming elections caused much scrambling and sparing between
Congress and the President in 1948. Congress extended the expiring Trade
Agreements Act, but for the first time limited it to a one year extension. In
addition, the "peril point" clause (the provision that before entering into
trade agreement commitments, the President must submit a list of the items
to be negotiated to the Tariff Commission, which in turn was required to
o






investigate, including public hearings, and report to the President the
maximum decrease in duty rates that could be made to each item without
injury to domestic industry) was for the first time written into law as a
part of the 1948 Trade Agreements Extension Act. In his own right,
President Truman can be justly accused of keeping an eye on the elections
5because of his delay in submitting the ITO charter.
After the elections, the Democrats set about reversing many of the 80th
Congress'es directions. One of the more obvious was the Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1948. The 81st Congress repealed the 1948 Act, including
the peril point provision, and extended the original Act, as amended in 1945,
for three years. After the passage of that extension, the President, by
Executive Order, established the procedures to be followed in concluding
trade agreements. Essentially, these were the same as those in effect
before 1948. As before, the Tariff Commission was designated as the agency




In April 1949, the President submitted the proposed ITO Charter to
Congress. Strong opposition was raised throughout the business community,
primarily on two counts: "the Charter is a codification of malpractice, and
5lbid
.
U.S., United States Tariff Commission, "Annual Report of the United
States Tariff Commission, 1949" (Washington, D. C: Government Printing




it is a victory for economic planning. " The House Foreign Affairs Committee
held hearings on the Charter in 1950, but it was never reported out of
committee. The year before, 1949, saw the negotiation and ratification of
the International Wheat Agreement between forty-one countries which
stipulated amounts and prices of wheat to be traded for four years hence.
This agreement has been extended and modified several times, backed up by
subsidies for wheat exporters, and eventually expanded into the International
Grains Arrangement (in 1968). It has been a significant instrument in U.S.
o
farm policy since its original enactment.
The beginning of the 1950s brought with them increased discussion and
9
general criticism of trade policies. Several bills were introduced which
were aimed at reductions in specific commodities or in extension of existing
controls. For example, a bill to increase the borrowing authority of the
Commodity Credit Corporation which would have effectively restricted some
agricultural imports was introduced but eventually watered down; fur imports
caused several "anti-fur" amendments to be proposed, but they too were
7 Brown, The United States and the Restoration of World Trade
, p. 362.
o
M.A.G. van Meerhaeghe, International Economic Institutions (New
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 190-197.
9An observation can be made here that in recent U.S. history the early
years of a decade nearly always bring with them a revival of interest in
foreign trade policies as evidenced by the following legislation: the Anti-
Dumping Act of 1921 and the American Selling Price Act of 1922; the Tariff
Act of 1930 and the Trade Agreements Act of 1934; lend-lease agreements
and other wartime measures in 1940-1941; the more stringent Trade Agree-
ments Extension Act of 1951; the Trade Expansion Act of 1962; and the current
"Nixon Trade Bill" that has been under consideration since November 1969.
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defeated or shelved; and a sub-committee of the Senate Public Welfare
Committee recommended a substantial increase in oil tariffs, which again
received no immediate action. But the pressure was building, and the
Republicans were enlisting enough Democratic defectors from the liberal
trade ranks to succeed in passing several restrictive measures in 1951.
The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 was an extension for two
years. Two important changes were made by that Act. First, the peril point
procedures were reinstated, but with the significant modification that the
Tariff Commission was required to submit peril point findings to two
committees of Congress when the President chose to disregard them. This
was a subtle change, but reflected increased concern of Congress over their
ability to control trade policies. The second major change was the inclusion
of specific escape clause legislation. Previously, instructions to the Tariff
Commission concerning escape clause provisions were contained only in
Executive Orders. These orders had given the Commission considerable
leeway in determining just when an investigation was warranted. The 1951
Act required that the Commission undertake such investigations whenever
duly requested, plus many other detailed requirements. Both the peril
point and escape clause provisions have remained part of our foreign trade
policy ever since.
Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and the Nation, 1945 -
1964
, p. 195.
^American Enterprise Institute, Special Analysis, "Foreign Trade, "
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1962), pp. 26-36.
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Other provisions of the 1951 Act included a prohibition against trade
agreements inconsistent with farm import restrictions; a ban on Russian and
Communist Chinese furs; and a directive for the President to suspend or
withdraw reduced trade agreement rates of import duties with the Soviet
Union and other Communist dominated countries. The Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1951 was the first of the Extension Acts to impose serious
restrictions on the President's ability to administer the trade agreements
program. It was, indeed, the first of the Extension Acts to be truly protec-
tionist in flavor.
Another significant piece of legislation in 1951 concerning foreign trade
was the extension of the Defense Production Act of 1950. Congress extended
import controls on fats and oils, and added peanuts and dairy products to the
list. Following enactment of the bill (reluctantly signed by the President) the
Secretary of Agriculture embargoed imports of butter, butter oil and dried
milk, and placed quotas on cheese. The latter action caused serious objections
from several GATT member nations.
No major trade policy changes were made during President Truman's
last year in office. The cheese quotas were increased by 15 per cent and a
tuna quota bill was defeated.
From 1945 through 1951, imports rose from $4. 098 billion to $10. 817
billion, while equivalent ad valorem rates on dutiable imports decreased from
1 o
Joe R. Wilkinson, Politics and Trade Policy (Washington, D. C.
:
Public Affairs Press, 1960), p. 66.
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29 per cent to 12. 5 per cent. During the same period exports rose from
$10,309 billion to $14,885 billion. The most significant statistic, however, is
the ratio of imports to GNP, which rose from 1. 93 per cent in 1945 to 3. 29 per
cent in 1951. President Truman advocated free trade throughout his
Presidency. The record would seem to indicate that his administration was
successful in reducing the barriers.
Eisenhower—Years of Conflict
As the Republicans took control of both Executive and Legislative
branches of government for the first time in twenty years, the expectation was
for a definite reversal of the expansionist trade policies of the Democrats.
Congress had grown increasingly more dubious of Presidential powers over
tariff policies. They had extended the Trade Agreements Act for only two
years in 1951 and had written into it more protective safeguards than had
ever been included before. Republicans in Congress hung on stubbornly to the
old-time protectionist beliefs, and were achieving moderate success in winning
13
over some Democratic sympathizers, particularly from the south. Also,
since General Eisenhower was a comparative unknown factor where foreign
policy was concerned, it was strongly felt that the influence the eastern-
financial interests enjoyed with him would work to carry him away from liberal
l^Paul H. Douglas, America in the Market Place (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 99.
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trade advocacy. In all, it was not a promising time for free trade proponents.
As President Eisenhower settled into his new job, one of his first major
policy decisions was what course to follow in foreign trade. He decided, in
the face of continued international tensions and a party backing of traditional
protectionists, to follow a moderate course.
The administration, to be sure, never proposed to blow a Joshua's
trumpet which would bring all tariff walls crashing down. We recognized
that this course could visit hardship on many workers and their families.
We recognized, too, that the Soviet threat and the demands of free
countries' national security impaired the free working of pure economic
law by requiring individual countries to be at least partly self-sufficient,
able to produce goods for their armies and navies which other countries,
if war should end forever, might better produce for them. To go full out
in the direction of free trade, I insisted, the world would need permanent
peace.
In the circumstances, the 1951 Trade Agreements Act (sic) then on the
books seemed to me adequate, although I recognized that certain features
might be modified. On April 7 (1953) I therefore sent a special message
to the Congress recommending renewal of the act in its present form for
one year. That year would give the administration time to undertake a
broad study of American foreign-trade policy in its entirety- -a study to
be conducted by a joint Executive-Legislative commission on foreign
economic policy, which I also asked the Congress to establish by
legislation. ^
This course seemed to appease free trade advocates fairly well, but
the protectionists were far from satisfied. Restrictive bills were introduced
into the House and debated at length. Targets for the protectionists were an
enlargement of the Tariff Commission, a requirement for the President to
follow the Commission's peril point and escape clause recommendations,
and new quotas on metal and petroleum products. In the end, the President's
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change 1953-1956 (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), p. 209.
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proposals won out. The Act was extended for one year and the Commission
on Foreign Economic Policy (Randall Commission) was appointed. A
phenomenon that was beginning to appear during this time, however, was the
splitting of both houses of Congress, not along party lines, but rather into
15
definite "free trade" and "protectionist" blocs.
Other actions which had some bearing on foreign trade in 1953 were the
Customs Simplification Act, which revised and liberalized many customs
regulations which had not been modified since 1938; the lapsing of the "cheese
amendment;" a new International Wheat Agreement between forty-five
countries which extended the 1949 Act; and the President's proclamation fixing
maximum imports of dairy products.
The Trade Agreements Act was due to expire once again in 1954. The
President requested a three year extension, as recommended by the majority
report of the Randall Commission, but because it was an election year and
because the country was experiencing a general recession, he indicated his
willingness to accept another one year extension. This was passed, with little
controversy by Congress.
The Randall Commission reported out in 1954 with several major
recommendations: a 5 per cent per year further tariff reduction authority for
the President along with the three year extension of the Trade Agreements
1
5







Act; further simplification of customs regulations and procedures; amendment
of the Buy American Act of 1933 to give the President wider latitude in
national security matters; a repeal of the requirement to transport foreign
aid shipments in U.S. bottoms; and renegotiation of a charter for an organi-
zation to supervise GATT, in other words, a replacement for the still-born
ITO. The President requested only the first two of these proposals from
Congress in 1954, but for the same reasons that the President was content to
settle for a minimum extension, Congress granted it. They did, however,
enact another Customs Simplification Act, the primary emphasis of which was
to require the Tariff Commission to study revision of tariff classifications
and to report in two years.
After the Democrats won control of the 84th Congress in 1954, President
Eisenhower decided that the time was ripe to ask them for a three year
extension of the Trade Agreements Act with the right to reduce tariffs as
recommended by the Randall Commission, and to approve of membership in
an Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC), which was to be the successor
to ITO. OTC had been conceived in March 19 55 during consultations between
the same nations which had signed the ITO charter in 1948. The OTC would
administer the trade rules of the GATT, sponsor trade negotiations, facilitate
1
8
consultation on trade, and make recommendations on trade policy.
17
Ibid
. , p. 198.
18Eisenhower, Mandate for Change 1953-1956, p. 499,
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Congress did agree to the three year extension, with the requested expanded
tariff reducing powers, and other provisions, but once again voted down
membership in a world trade organization.
President Eisenhower, by this time, had taken up the cudgel of free
trade and was in the paradoxical situation of having to combat a Democratically
controlled Congress which was becoming exceedingly protectionist. He wrote:
The problem of trade was constantly on my mind. In July of 1954, for
example, I wrote Everett Hazlett on the danger of Mexico's possibly turn-
ing antagonistic if the United States raised its tariffs; and I criticized
those businessmen who, while talking 'rugged individualism, ' clung to
tariffs for help,
and,
I believed that United States membership in the OTC would be good for
the country and for the Free World. Failure to assume membership, I
argued, could be interpreted throughout the Free World as proof that we
were insincere in speaking favorably of the need to trade.
Actions, however, sometimes belied those words. The Administration
ordered a 50 per cent increase in the tariff rate on imported bicycles, refused
to honor the low bid by an English firm for generators for a dam project
because of the Buy American Act of 1933, and told oil importers to cut their
imports or face mandatory quotas. Further, the Extension Act of 1955
increased the President's authority to invoke restrictions under the peril
point, escape clause, and national security provisions, while at the same time





for three years, or to reduce tariff rates above 50 per cent ad valorem
to 50 per cent.
The years 1957 and 1958 saw President Eisenhower again attempt to
persuade Congress to ratify U.S. membership in OTC. Each year his
attempts were in vain. He argued that the OTC would benefit world trade
while not harming U.S. interests, since it could not, as strictly an adminis-
trative organization, alter the control of Congress over U.S. trade. On the
other hand, he stated membership would "provide the most effective and
expeditious means for removing discriminations and restrictions against
20American exports. " The protectionists in Congress, however, saw such
membership in just the opposite light and insisted, much as they had in 1949
and 1950, that such an organization would replace Congressional control and
eventually be used to irrepairably damage U.S. industry. By the time
President Eisenhower's third such request was forwarded in 1957, Congres-
sional leadership was aware that such a proposal was hopeless, and just
ignored it.
The Customs Simplification Act of 1953 had originally established
"export values" (the price at which goods were offered for export) as the
basis for customs appraisal of dutiable imports, rather than the higher of
either "export value" or "foreign value" (the price at which goods were
offered for sale in the country of origin), but that section had been dropped to




allow further study of its effects. That provision was enacted into law in 1956,
Also, several obsolete articles of customs law were revised. In four years,
1953-1956, the entire customs procedures had been revised and streamlined.
Separate laws in 1956, 1957, and 1958 saw a new International Wheat
Agreement approved, wool tariff exemptions enacted, and the President
establishing quotas on lead and zinc. The primary interest in foreign trade
in those years, however, was the newly formed European Common Market
(EEC), and just how the United States should deal with it. The Trade
Agreements Act was due to expire in 1958, and the issue of what new legis-
lation should be enacted in order to cooperate, compete, and grow with EEC
was discussed and analyzed beginning long before it expired.
The establishment of the EEC was in accord with long-term U.S. policy
of encouraging the economic integration of Europe, but it did impose a threat
to American exports to Western Europe. One of the major provisions of the
EEC charter was the eventual abolishment of all internal tariffs and trade
21
restraints and a uniform external tariff.
The President's request to Congress in 1958 was for a five-year exten-
sion of the trade act "unweakened by amendments of a kind that would impair
its effectiveness. " It included sought for authority to reduce tariffs up to
25 per cent of existing rates, a proposal supported by the Departments of
21 Douglas, America in the Market Place
, p. 114.




State and Commerce, and to increase tariff rates up to 50 per cent above their
1934 level if necessary to protect domestic industries, a provision it was
hoped would mollify free trade opponents. The Administration considered
that these steps were necessary to meet EEC competition. The debate in
Congress on the proposed extension was long and arduous. Major "educational"
campaigns were launched by the two opposing camps, and individual regions
were provided with detailed studies of exactly how the proposals would effect
23
their district's industry.
Congress voted to extend the act for four years, until 1962, and
included the other provisions substantially as they had been requested.
Reduction authority was granted in three ways:
The first method provides for a reduction of the rates existing on
July 1, 1958 by not more than 20 percent. The second method provides,
subject to the provision that the duty on an article can not be entirely
removed, for a reduction of the July 1, 1958 rate by not more than 2
percentage points ad valorem. On rates under 10 percent ad valorem
,
or its equivalent, this alternative permits a greater reduction than the
maximum decrease under the first method. . . . The third method
provides for reduction to 50 percent ad valorem , or its equivalent, of a
duty which is in excess of that rate. On rates in excess of 62. 5 percent
ad valorem
,
the third alternative method would permit a greater reduction
that (sic) would be possible under the other two alternative methods. ^4
A summation is in order, since 1958 was the last of the Trade Agreements
Extension Acts, of just exactly how much tariff reduction authority the
President had been granted since 1934. Theoretically, with reduction powers
23Ibid.
24American Enterprise Institute, "Foreign Trade, "p. 7.
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of 50 per cent in 1934, 50 per cent in 1945, 15 per cent in 1955, and 20 per
cent in 1958, the tariff rate applying to a specific article could have been
reduced to . 0075 per cent of its 1934 rate. Whether or not this total
reduction was applied to any commodity is not within the scope of this paper.
In 1959, foreign economic policy took on new complexities. Despite
a merchandise export surplus, $17, 470 billion to $14,987 billion, the United
States' total "Balance of Payments" was a deficit of $3. 8 billion, which had
followed on a 1958 deficit of $3. 5 billion. Much of this deficit was attributable
to the resurgence of Western Europe after formation of the EEC, and
subsequent transfer of dollar assets to the Community. Since the BOP
includes many factors in addition to merchandise exports and imports, a
detailed analysis of that problem is not within the scope of this study. It is
important to recognize, however, that from 1959 on, foreign policy, including
foreign trade policy, has been influenced, and at times dictated, by the BOP
situation. President Eisenhower took several steps to combat the problem,
including reduction of U.S. Armed Forces dependents overseas, urging
Europeans to take over more of the foreign aid burdens, and forming of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Also,
several steps were taken in an attempt to encourage increased exports and
25increased foreign travel in the U.S.
Other actions affecting foreign trade in 1959 and 1960 were another




extension and enlargement of the International Wheat Agreement, large
subsidies to the fishing vessel construction industry, and a Presidential
pocket veto of a bill requiring that imported articles be marked to indicate
their country of origin when removed from their original container for
2fi
repackaging.
During President Eisenhower's years in office imports rose from
$10, 778 billion to $15,013 billion, with a smaller proportional increase in
exports from $15. 653 billion to $20. 408 billion. Significant, however, is
the fact that the ratio of dutiable amounts entering the country to total
imports rose from 45. 1 per cent to 59. 1 per cent while the ratio of ad
valorem rates on dutiable imports remained almost constant, 12. 3 per cent
in 1953, and 12.2 per cent in 1960. General Eisenhower entered office an
unknown quantity in the world of foreign trade, and left advocating free trade
while the record of his administration did not completely substantiate that
advocacy.
Kennedy- -The New Frontier
Even before the 1960 elections, John F. Kennedy began formulating his
policy directions. He utilized task forces, committees, and, above all,





Near the top of his list was a new direction for U.S. foreign trade. A task
force on foreign policy, headed by Adlai E. Stevenson, presented Kennedy w
with its report a week before the election. In it was included an idea,
attributed to George W. Ball, for a comprehensive economic bill which
would combine certain foreign aid proposals and a delegation to the President
of five-year authority to reduce tariffs by 50 per cent across the board. Thus was
27born the seed that eventually germinated into the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
Like his Democratic predecessors, Franklin Roosevelt and Harry
Truman, John Kennedy was a liberal and a believer in the theory of free
trade. He stated, when presenting his proposed legislation to Congress in
January 1962:
. . . moreover, we must reduce our tariffs if we hope to reduce tariffs
abroad and thereby increase our exports and export surplus. There are
many more American jobs dependent upon exports than could possibly
be adversely affected by increased imports. And those export industries
are our strongest, most efficient, highest paying growth industries. °
He combined this desire for expanded trade with a keen political sense and
insight. With the Trade Agreements Act due to expire in 1962, an election
year, many of his advisors cautioned the President to simply seek a one-year
extension of the Act as President Eisenhower had done in 1954. The President
concluded, however, that events in Europe were gaining momentum, and that
27Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.
,
A Thousand Days, John F. Kennedy in
the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company; and Cambridge: The
Riverside Press, 1965), pp. 155-156.
°John F. Kennedy, Public Papers of the President of the United btates :
Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President
1962 (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 73.
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the EEC was solidifying its position at such a rapid rate that the U.S. was
going to have to move fast if it were going to protect its interests. He
surmised that the mood of Congress would be such as to allow passage of his
program aimed at expanding his tariff bargaining powers. He therefore
submitted to Congress in early 1962 a new trade bill that would replace the
eleven-times extended Trade Agreements Act of 1934.
The trade expansion fight became the major legislative issue of 1962.
A country-wide campaign was organized, a potent Committee for a National
Trade Policy set up; business and labor were enlisted, Congressmen
pressed and persuaded. 'The two great Atlantic markets, ' the President
told Congress, 'will either grow together or they will grow apart. . . .
That decision will either mark the beginning of a new chapter in the
alliance of free nations -or a threat to the growth of Western unity.
The bill was passed substantially as President Kennedy had requested.
In order to placate many of the industrial organizations initially opposed to
such a bill, the traditional safeguards of the escape clause and national
security procedures, were written into it, but in place of the peril point
clause, there was a significant new one- -"trade adjustment assistance. "
This clause permitted the giving of financial assistance to those industries
and companies which actually suffered or were threatened with financial injury
as a direct result of increased imports created by lowering specific tariffs.
Low interest loans could be made, and unemployment compensation could be
paid to affected workers. The Randall Commission had recommended such a
policy in 1954, but protectionist forces long opposed it for fear of losing one
29Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 874.
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of their primary arguments against lower tariff rates. The provision was put
into the bill as one of the condescensions to organized labor for their support.
That it will ever prove to be as helpful as they had hoped is doubtful. "But
the final result of this provision was highly unsatisfactory. As of March 7,
1966, not a single American worker had ever received any compensation for
on
damages suffered by reductions in the tariff.
The major provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as it was
passed, were:
• Authorized the President, in the conduct of trade negotiations
between July 1, 1962, and June 30, 1967, to reduce duties by 50 percent
of the 1962 level; to remove duties on entire categories of goods when the
U.S. and members of the European Economic Community (at the time of
negotiations) together accounted for 80 percent or more of total free world
trade; to cut or remove tariffs on agricultural products not meeting the
80 percent rule if necessary to maintain or expand U.S. farm exports; and
to eliminate tariffs on products currently dutiable at a rate of 5 percent or
less.
• Authorized the President to withdraw concessions to any country
maintaining 'unreasonable' restrictions against U.S. exports; to impose
duties or other restrictions on imports from countries with burdensome
restrictions against U.S. agricultural exports; to restrict imports if they
threatened national security; and directed him to suspend 'as soon as
practicable' any trade benefits granted since 1930 under most-favored-
nation treatment to 'any country or area dominated or controlled by
Communism' (meaning Poland and Yugoslava). (Mr. Kennedy withheld
action on this proviso and got Congress to repeal it in 1963.
)
• Required the President to submit to the Tariff Commission a list of
articles on which he planned to negotiate, the Commission to hold hearings
and to advise him on the probable economic effect of any tariff cut inter-
nationally and domestically; to appoint a Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations as the chief U.S. spokesman in trade talks; and to establish a
Cabinet-level Interagency Trade Organization.
• Authorized the President- -in case of injury to domestic workers or
businesses through earlier or subsequent tariff cuts --to raise tariffs,
negotiate an international quota system, provide federal assistance to those
30Douglas, America in the Market Place, pp. 126-127.
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injured, or take any of these steps in combination, following investigation
by the Tariff Commission; and authorized aid to firms in the form of
technical assistance, loans, loan guarantees, or permission to carry back
a net operating loss for tax purposes for five years instead of the usual
three, and to workers in the form of unemployment compensation,
counseling and retraining, travel and relocation allowances. 31
As passed, the Act gave the President negotiating power substantially
greater than ever before, and incomparably greater than that under which the
Dillon Round (1960-1962) negotiators were operating. The "dominant supplier"
and "adjustment assistance" clauses were new and unprecedented, and
promised to provide the President the necessary working room within which
to reduce tariffs and barriers to an all-time low level. If all of the authority
encompassed in the bill were utilized, tariff reductions would be considerably
greater than the nominal 50 per cent. The 1962 Act was considered the most
liberal trade bill yet enacted.
The Trade Expansion Act was the focal point of the Administration's
foreign trade thrust, and it occupied the majority of interest. It was not,
however, the only foreign trade related program or legislation enacted during
Kennedy's three years in the White House. In 1961, the agreement to
establish the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
was ratified by the Senate. OECD, as agreed upon by the U.S., Canada, and
eighteen Western European nations, was a consultative body designed to aid
economic growth and employment in the member countries and to expand




world trade. The Senate added language to the ratification resolution stating
that nothing in the convention added to or detracted from the powers of the
President or Congress, partly to allay the protectionist fears that OECD
might pre-empt U.S. rights concerning tariffs and trade.
Also passed in 1961 were bills establishing the U.S. Travel Service in
the Department of Commerce whose purpose was to promote foreign travel in
the U.S.; and reducing from $500 to $100 the value of duty-free articles
returning citizens could bring into the U.S. Both of these acts were in
32
response to the continuning decline in the BOP situation.
In 1962 the Long Term Agreements (LTA) on cotton textile imports were
reached with seventeen other countries. Designed primarily to placate the
staunchly protectionist and very powerful textile industry during arguments
over the Trade Expansion Act, the act permitted the U.S. to restrict the
foreign share of the cotton textile market to 6 per cent. Originally covering
only the signing nations, the authority was eventually extended to authorize the
President to regulate non-signer imports as well. Also, the President in 1962
increased tariffs on certain tapestries, carpets, and glass products but
refused to do so for ceramic tiles and baseball gloves. Even so, the EEC
retaliated by raising tariffs on U.S. exports worth $27 million. And, finally,
33








The infamous "chicken war" erupted in 1963 when the EEC put its
common tariff on frozen poultry- -U. S. exports dropped sharply. Disagree-
ment on the level of damage was put to a GATT panel, who decided that
concessions on $26 million would be proper compensation. Tariffs were
increased on brandy, trucks, dextrine, and potato starch. Also, in a
continuation of his efforts to aid the cotton industry, President Kennedy
proposed subsidies when the Tariff Commission rejected the use of import
fees. After a year-long debate, the Congress authorized subsidies for two
years, and also included wheat provisions, as well as cotton.
Finally, one other action that was in progress in 19 63, was the "coffee
agreement" debate. In an attempt to stabilize the price of coffee to corres-
pond with Alliance for Progress objectives, the Administration took the lead
in negotiating a five-year stabilization agreement with fifty-three other
countries. Designed to keep prices from dropping below the 1962 level, the
agreement required exporters to furnish certificates of origin, and importers
to limit their purchases from countries not signing. The Administration
backed the agreement, which had been signed in 1962, but the debate in
Congress centered around the argument that it would effect higher coffee
prices. Several amendments and changes to the original act were made and
34
the discussion lasted through 1963, until it was finally defeated in 1964.
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As with many of his programs, President Kennedy's foreign trade
policy was liberal and expansionist. The Trade Expansion Act that he
engineered through Congress was a masterpiece of policy formulation and
political acumen. That he was able to get it passed at the same time as so
many protectionist or limiting bills were also being proposed is one more
testimony of his ability and perseverance. It was the catalyst that led to the
very successful GATT round of discussions which were named after the
President.
Johnson- -Pursuit of the Goal
The tragic circumstance behind the change in Presidents in late 1963 left
the entire country wondering just what kind of a Chief Executive Lyndon
Johnson would be. It was not long before it became quite clear that in the
field of foreign trade he was destined to follow his predecessor's liberal
footsteps, perhaps enlarging upon them. In his first State of the Union
Message to Congress, just forty-six days after assuming the Presidency, he
said:
. . . we must expand world trade. Having recognized in the Act of 1962
that we must buy as well as sell, we now expect our trading partners to
recognize that we must sell as well as buy. We are willing to give them
competitive access to our market, asking only that they do the same for
us ... ;
and in his statement on economic issues in October, 1964:
. . .
The Trade Expansion Act is one of the great legislative monuments
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to President Kennedy's leadership, and this administration is fully
committed to its vigorous implementation.
. . .
The main thrust of
this administration- -as of Democratic and Republican administrations
for the past 30 years --will be toward trade liberalization. 35
Since the Kennedy Round of negotiations under the GATT had been made
possible by the 1962 Act and were to begin in 1964, there was little in the way
of immediate policy or program that had to be accomplished. President
Johnson was very pleased and proud of the 1962 bill and of the negotiations in
progress. He continued to speak of forthcoming tariff reductions throughout
1965, 1966, and 1967. When the round was complete he signed the proclama-
tion in December 1967, and said:
Beginning January 1 our tariffs on many of the products that we import
will drop in the first of what will be five annual reductions.
This will mean lowering prices to our consumers and lowering costs
to our manufacturers.
This will mean bigger export sales, we hope, for American business-
men and American farmers.
(All) will gain in higher wages for the workers, in more efficient
factories, in rising incomes for us all, and for our trading partners
throughout the world.
Trade will be a critical test of our cooperation. The reduced tariffs
of the Kennedy Round will give rise to many demands for protection here
and abroad.
We must all stand firm against short-sighted protectionism.
In 1964, protectionists in the meat industry attempted to impose
restrictive quotas on the importing of fresh and frozen beef, veal, mutton,
o c
Lyndon B. Johnson, Public Papers of the President of the United
States: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the
President 1963-64 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965),
Book I, p. 117; and, Book II, p. 1518.




and lamb, and Congress passed the measure. The President, through some
maneuvering, managed to limit the quota to a 10 per cent use above the
1959-1963 level of imports, a much more liberal restriction. Congress also,
in 1964, closed a loophole in existing laws which had permitted the selling of
wheat to Poland and Yugoslavia.
Congress extended the Export Control Act of 1949 for four more years
in 1965. The Act contained the basic authority to control exports to Communist
nations and to regulate exports in line with U.S. foreign policy aims. The
Administration wanted to make the Act permanent, but settled for the
extension. Also, the Coffee Agreement was finally passed after being blocked
in 1964. It was one of the Administration's top priorities and ratified the
37
agreement signed by fifty-four countries in 1962.
East-West trade became a serious consideration in 1965. Several
factions wanted to expand trade relations with Communist countries since the
market potential was vast. Nothing was done, after much discussion, in 1965,
but the subject was beginning to be heard more and more. Significant pro-
grams and legislation dealt specifically with the subject in subsequent years,
and it was a topic debated frequently in Congress. Details of East-West trade
will be dealt with in Chapter V.
One other significant Act was passed in 1965. After heated debate,
Congress agreed to authorize the President to remove tariff duties on
37Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and the Nation, 1965 -
1968, Volume II, pp. 61-64.
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Canadian autos. It was designed to implement an agreement between the two
countries to remove all automobile tariffs, on repair parts as well as on
new cars. After heated debate the bill was passed and signed into law. The
International Wheat Agreement was also continued by law, but for the first
time the extension was for only one year, as it would be again in 1966.
There was no major trade legislation passed in 1966. East-West trade
was an issue but the spot-light was beginning to turn toward Geneva, where
the tariff negotiations were gathering momentum. Protectionists, therefore,
were gathering their forces for all-out battle if agreements were reached that
could lower tariffs substantially.
As the Kennedy Round negotiations came to a close in May 1967,
industries throughout the country were clammering for protection before the
tariff reductions could be made final. Congress was inundated with proposals
for quotas and other restrictions. The many bills were accompanied by an
intensive lobbying campaign. Most of those specific bills never got out of
committee. One bill, however, the Low-Wage Import Act, which would have
required investigation into charges that low-wage imports were detrimental
to domestic industries, passed the House. The Administration strongly
opposed the plan, and it never passed the Senate. Another was that which
would have reduced quotas on certain cotton products from countries which
had severed diplomatic relations with the U.S. The reduction was to be
permanent and ostensibly was to "punish" countries with differing foreign
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policies. In reality, however, it would have permitted domestic producers
a much greater market. It passed Congress and the President vetoed it in
1968. 38
With the conclusion of the negotiations, but before the agreed upon tariff
cuts were actually put into effect, the Administration recognized the need for
further foreign trade legislation. Two major parts of the U.S. agreements
required Congressional action- -the new International Grains Agreement, and
the repeal of the American Selling Price method of tariff determination on
benzoid chemicals. The President hoped, too, to have the 1962 administra-
tive assistance provision liberalized because it had proved so difficult for
U.S. firms to "prove injury" from imports that had increased as a result of
reduced tariffs. Also, he wanted a bill that would provide him with expanded
bargaining authority for trade negotiations and the power to explore liberali-
zation of non-tariff barriers when the present authority contained in the 1962
Act expired in mid-1967. But protectionist sentiment was rampant, and
Lyndon Johnson was enough of a politician to know that the political exigencies
of the situation were such as to block passage of any further free trade bill.
He did not introduce the bill until May 1968, well after the trade negotiation
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agreements had been put into effect.
The Trade Expansion Act of 1968, as proposed, was as liberal and far-








from the start. The protectionists continued to introduce many quota bills,
so the Congress had its hands full with trade legislation. Primary among
the protectionist lobbies were the old dependables of textiles, oils, steel,
and chemicals. The Administration managed, through lobbying efforts of
its own, to fend off the industry efforts, but at the same time the Expansion
Act was never reported our of committee.
This was a considerable disappointment to President Johnson, as it
meant that he would pass out of office without having succeeded in extending
the President's tariff reducing powers beyond those which he had inherited.
Negotiating authority under the 1962 Act had expired June 30, 1967. He did,
however, in his last year in office, appoint a study commission, composed
primarily of prominant businessmen, to look into all aspects of the United
State's foreign trade policy, with the view toward strengthening exports and
expanding world trade in the 1970s. The group was headed by William M.
Roth, chief negotiator during the Kennedy Round, and the President's
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. The "Roth Commission"
reported its findings to the President too late in his administration to see
any of its recommendations acted upon. Basically, they called for expanded
tariff reduction powers, but not surprisingly, when considering the make-up
of the group, also recommended greatly enhanced protective measures for
domestic industry.
40William M. Roth, "Future United States Foreign Trade Policy, " A
Report to the President, submitted by the Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969).
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President Johnson left office at a time of increasing protectionist
sentiment with no pending trade expansion powers. His Administration had
very definitely been one of free trade advocacy, but powerful forces worked
against him. During his term, 1964-1968, imports increased at a much
faster rate, $18. 613 billion to $32. 991 billion, than did exports, $26,297
billion to $34. 199 billion. Also, the ratio of imports for consumption to
output continued to rise, 5. 85 per cent to 7. 66 per cent, at an accelerated
rate. The nation's economy was inflated by the Vietnam War and the unrest
at home served to diminish the importance of foreign trade. His trade policy
was of free trade, and it is probably to his credit that he was able to hold the
line as well as he did.
Nixon- -Trimming the Sails
When Richard Nixon became President, circumstances were more
favorable for a swing toward protectionism than at any time since World
War II. The 91st Congress was Democratic, but protectionist; tariff
reductions resulting from the recent negotiations had stirred up a nest of
protectionist sentiment and actions; inflation was rampant, calling for
decreased imports and increased exports; and there were no major free-
trade bills or negotiations pending. In addition, it was rumored, the
southern textile industry had put up large sums of money to back Nixon's
campaign and was seeking relief from Japanese imports in return.
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President Nixon early called for a continued advocacy of the previous
free trade policies, but in contrast to his predecessors' positions, each
pronouncement he made contained a strong emphasis on the necessity to
strengthen domestic industry safeguards. At a press conference in March
1969, he said:
. . . I . . . indicated that I favored freer trade rather than restrictions
on trade, but that it would be very difficult to resist that kind of (protec-
tionist) pressure
. . .
A final note in this respect: as we look at the whole trade pattern, I
think we have to realize that we cannot anticipate in the near future another
big round of reductions of tariff barriers. We are going to do well if we
can digest what we have on the plate. . . . ^1
It was necessary, however, that a new Trade Bill, of some kind, be
submitted. So in November 1969, President Nixon asked Congress to pass his
proposed legislation. It was a lengthy bill, and had four main features:
The trade bill which I am submitting today addresses these new problems
of the 1970s. It is modest in scope, but significant in its impact. It
continues the general drive toward freer world trade. It also explicitly
recognizes that, while seeking to advance world interest, U.S. trade
policies must also respect legitimate U.S. interests, and that to be fair
to our trading partners does not require us to be unfair to our own people.
Specifically:
-It restores the authority needed by the President to make limited tariff
reductions.
-It takes concrete steps toward the increasingly urgent goal of lowering
non-tariff barriers to trade. (It would have eliminated the ASP tariff
pricing system. )
-It recognizes the very real plight of particular industries, companies,
and workers faced with import competition, and provides for readier relief
in these special cases. (It proposed liberalization of the administrative
assistance and escape clause provisions.)
41 Richard M. Nixon, Public Papers of the President of the United States :
Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President
1969
,
(Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office), pp. 97-98.
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-It strengthens GATT. (By providing permanent funding for U.S. GATT
participation. )42
The "Nixon Trade Act of 1969" was, when compared to other recent
trade bills, a protectionist measure. And perhaps that was its own down-fall.
With the specific relief included for the textile industry, the door was open
for all the other protectionist industries to seek a seat on the trolley.
Chairman Mills fought the bill through months of hearings and volumes of
testimony, and when it was over, it was presented to Congress as the most
protectionist measure considered since 1930.
Fortunately, however, debate was. so vitriolic and prolonged that the bill
ran into the stops. It was shelved, after more furious scurrying to get it
through on the tails of a Social Security Bill, in order to allow the Senate to
clean up last minute business at the end of the 91st Congress. It's back in the
92nd, however, as protectionist as ever. Whether or not it will be passed as
is, is only conjecture.
In the meantime, President Nixon's record as a free trade advocate is
still a matter that time will tell. He continues to preach free trade- -but he








It is easy to show that the five President's in office since 1945
have professed the tenants of free trade. The facts of their pursuit of such a
policy provide somewhat varied results. Truman and Kennedy took major
steps toward trade liberalization with vigor and perserverance. Eisenhower
and Johnson may be judged by posterity to have been victims of their times.
While they sought trade liberalization legislation, the Congress and the nation
prevented substantial moves in that direction. The book is still out on Nixon,
but his major policy speeches and his first significant proposal in the area of
foreign trade seem to indicate at least a partial return to the old-time
Republican protectionism.
\
Since the average ad valorem equivalent tariff rate on dutiable imports
for consumption has decreased steadily since 1945, perhaps it is a fair
measurement of the degree of liberalization effected by each administration.
Table 1 provides a comparison of the decrease in this rate for each
Presidential term, in gross decrease, percentage of decrease, and decrease
per year. The results are startling. Only the Truman administration
accomplished significant average yearly reductions in the average ad valorem
equivalent tariff rates on dutiable imports. Of course, the figures must be
used with a good deal of caution and restriction. How much effect previous









Rate RateDecline % %/Yr
Truman 194 5 29. 0% 1952 12.8% 16.2% 56.0% 8.0%
Eisenhower 1952 12.8 1960 12.2 0.6 4.7 0.6
Kennedy 1960 12.2 1964 11.9 0.3 2.4 0.6
Johnson 1964 11.9 1969 11.2 0.7 5.9 1.2
Nixon 1969 11.2 -.-
on the results of the administration in power can only be surmised. The
statistics do seem to say, however, that since Truman, little real progress
has been made in the reduction of tariff rates.
\
The foregoing examined the professed policies of the administrations
that have been in office since 1945. It also reviewed, generally, the most
important federal legislation of the same twenty-five years in the field of
foreign trade. We should know what our leaders sought to do. What they
actually accomplished will be examined in the next two chapters. A great
deal of those accomplishments are the result of the Trade Agreements
Program. Chapter IV will examine that program in detail.

CHAPTER IV
THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM
Background
The backbone of United States trade policy since 19 34 has been the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program. Until 1947 agreements were
reached by means of bilateral negotiations. Concessions extended to some
were not necessarily extended to many. This was recognized as an adequate
system for many years, but the conclusion of the war and with it the severe
weakening of many countries' bargaining position, plus the emergence of a
"third world" of newly independent, but weak, states, brought with it the
widely acknowledged need for a more equitable and a more efficient means of
lowering trade barriers for all nations. This means was achieved by the
signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
At this writing the United States has eighty trade agreement obligations
in force, seventy-six through GATT, and four through bilateral agreements
with non-GATT nations. Although the GATT does not constitute 100 per cent
of our Trade Agreements Program, it is such an overwhelming part of it,




the Program will concern United States participation in the GATT. Its purpose
is to examine the results of trade agreements arrived at under the direction
of, and within the authority granted by, Executive Programs and Legislative
Acts.
Trade Agreements Prior to Geneva
Since the Trade Agreements Act was signed in 1934, several bilateral
agreements were reached with various countries prior to the Geneva nego-
tiations of 1947. They had been made with twenty-seven separate countries
(actually twenty-nine, but the Czechoslovakian and Nicaraguan agreements
were later suspended) whose trade constituted 69 per cent of the total U.S.
\
imports for consumption, free and dutiable, in 1939.
In 1939 (All pre-GATT trade values are based on the 1939 trade year.
This is done primarily because the post-war inflation tended to distort
prices and, therefore, the ad valorem equivalent of specific and compound
duties. Also, the composition and sources of the United States trade
commodities were more nearly "normal" in 1939 than in the war years, or
in 1946 and 1947. ) total U. S. imports for consumption amounted to $2. 276
billion. Of that total, $879 million was dutiable, and $1. 397 billion was
duty-free. Tariff reduction concessions had been made on dutiable imports
amounting to $562 million, or 63. 9 per cent of the total dutiable imports.
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In addition, the tariff rates on $41 million worth of imports were bound at
pre-arrangement levels. Of the $1. 397 billion worth of duty-free goods
imported, $1,180 billion, or 91 per cent, were duty-free bound as a result
of pre-GATT agreements. Thus, 78 per cent of all U.S. imports for con-
sumption were subject to one kind or another concession arrangement granted
in accordance with the 1934 Act, but prior to GATT.
Exports from the United States in 1939 amounted to $3.2 billion. Exports
to the twenty-seven countries with which trade agreements had been reached
amounted to $2. 247 billion. Of that total, pre-Geneva concessions had been
granted on $1. 278 billion, broken down as follows:
Binding of duty-free status: $ 293 million
Binding of tariff rate: 366 million
Reductions in tariff rate: 506 million i
i
*
Other commitments: 113 million 1
These data are considerably more general than the import data because of the
wide variation in treatment of imports among the various nations. They do
serve to illustrate, however, aggregate levels and trends.
Origins of The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade
GATT came into being more as a compromise solution, an expedient,
than as a planned and engineered entity. The U.S. Department of State
U.S., U.S. Tariff Commission, Operation of the Trade Agreements
Program June 1934 to April 1948, Part I, Summary (Washington, D. C. :
Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 1-39.
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published the "Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment" in
November 1945 for the purposes of delineating a multinational trading code
and the concepts of an international organization for the fostering and
regulating of world trade. Invitations to a conference to consider these
proposals were extended to nineteen other countries, but in March 1946 the
United Nations Economic and Social Council took over its planning from the
United States. The Council set up the Preparatory Committee of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Employment to draft the International Trade
Organization (ITO) Charter.
While the Preparatory Committee was meeting in Geneva from April
through October 1947, the nations forming the committee, by then twenty-
three in number, agreed to sponsor simultaneous negotiations for the reduction
of common tariffs and other trade restrictions. These negotiations were to
be conducted bilaterally, but through the General Provisions of the Agreement,
the agreements reached would be effected by all of the Contracting Parties.
The Tariff concessions resulting from these negotiations were then embodied
in a multilateral contract called the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
The very concept of multilateral trade agreements was unprecedented
in international commercial relations. Attempts had been made to reach
agreement upon maximum tariff rates and upon percentage reductions of
tariffs, but this was the first attempt to bring about lower duties by multi-
lateral, instead of bilateral, negotiations. The GATT was signed on




GATT was conceived of, and accepted to be, an impermanent arrange-
ment which would be incorporated fully into, and superceded by, the forth-
coming ITO Charter when that document was finally adopted and ratified. It
was intended only to provide a set of rules governing those tariff reductions
negotiated before the ITO could begin to permanently function.
Its objectives, as stated in its preamble, were to foster the improvement
in the standards of living, full employment, a large and steadily growing
volume of real income and effective demand, the full use of the world's
resources, and the expansion of production and international trade. More
specifically, it was stated that agreements reached substantially reducing
\
tariffs and other trade barriers, and eliminating international commercial
2discrimination, would contribute to the attainment of the objectives.
The core of the agreement is the most-favored-nation principle. It
provides that "any favor, privilege, or immunity granted by any contracting
party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall
be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating
in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties. As a
U.S., Department of State, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
,
Preamble and Article I, 1948. (The present agreement is embodied in Basic
Instruments and Selected Documents
, Volume IV, Text of the General Agree-
ment, 19 69, published by the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Geneva, 1969.).
°Basic Instruments and Selected Documents
,




result of this provision, nations which are neither particularly strong
importers, nor particularly strong exporters, benefit from the agreements
reached bilaterally between a strong importing nation and a strong exporting
nation. In this way, the objectives will be brought that much closer for all
the parties to the GATT.
Structure
The GATT is a complicated document. It has been revised significantly
on two separate occasions, once in 1954-1955, and again in 1965. It contains,
essentially, four fundamental principles, around which its detailed rules and
operating procedures have been built. First, trade should be conducted on the
basis of non-discrimination. Second, domestic industries should only be
protected by means of customs tariffs and not through other commcrical
measures. Third, consultation aimed at avoiding damage to members'
trading interests is the means to achieving the objectives. And, fourth, GATT
provides the framework within which negotiations can be held for the reduction
4
of tariffs and other barriers.
The primary means used in the efforts toward elimination of discrimi-
nation in trade is the most-favored-nation principle. As stated above, it is
the core of the agreement, and is the best possible method of eliminating
4Ernest H. Preeg, Traders and Diplomats (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1970), pp. 22-25; and van Meerhaeghe, International
Economic Institutions, pp. 162-172.
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bilateral agreements whi< , would have the effect of each country granting
greater advantage to its p .nary trading partn« ;. There are three
exceptions to the most-f.'^ red-nation clause. ri ey are the provisions
which allow adjacent countries to reciprocate special privileges in order to
facilitate border traffic; form a customs union; or, create a free trade area.
These privileges are limited, however, in that they may not adversly affect
trade with other Contracting Parties more than it was affected prior to the
forming of the union.
The provisions which limit trade barriers to customs duties and
eliminate quotas and other non-tariff barriers are the stabilizing factors in
the GATT arrangement. They are mandatory, but there are, again,
exceptions. These are granted primarily for temporary balance-of-payments
relief, agricultural support programs, and the prevention of market disrup-
tions. The tariff provisions also recognize the differences present between
high and low tariff countries and permit the low tariff ones to provide low
tariff consolidation or duty elimination in return for high tariff reductions.
There are safeguards, of course, to individual nations' domestic industries
in the form of the escape clause provision. This can be applied in several
instances, such as for less -developed nations, and for the protection of
national security, health, or morals.
The consultation principle is inherent throughout the GATT. The means
of consultation are embodied in the text, and GATT itself provides the
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mechanism. Potential trade problems and trade disputes are to be settled in
a mutually satisfactory agreement after consultation.
Negotiations on a periodic basis are provided for in the interest of
reducing trade barriers on a reciprocal and multilateral basis. As will be
seen, six such negotiating conferences have been held thus far.
The GATT document is divided into four parts, with thirty-eight
articles. The first part, containing articles I and II, spells out the objectives
of the agreement and the minimum obligations of the Contracting Parties,
i.e., the most-favored-nation clause. These articles may be amended only
by unanimous agreement of the Contracting Parties. Part II, articles III
through XXIII, forms the code of fair trade. Its provisions are the primary
instruments regulating trade practices, but are only binding insofar as they
do not conflict with individual national legislation. Hence, a country may
accede to the GATT without complete acceptance of it, but the exceptions
must be spelled out in the individual Protocol of Accession. Part III,
articles XXIV through XXXV, deals with the conditions of accession,
membership, withdrawal, amendments to the agreement, etc. Part III, as
well as Part I, requires mandatory acceptance. Part IV, articles XXXVI
through XXXVIII, was added in 1965. It deals with the trade and development
of the less developed nations. Its adoption was a tacit recognition of GATT's




Accession to the Agreement is open to any country in the world, but
since every newcomer automatically benefits from previously negotiated
tariff rates, newcomers are expected to enter into tariff negotiations with
existing Contracting Parties. When a government wishes to join the GATT
arrangements are made for the conduct of negotiations, and upon their
successful conclusion a "protocol of accession" is drawn up. This specifies
that the acceding country accepts the same rights and privileges, as well as
obligations, as the other members. Existing members do not generally drive
particularly hard bargains when negotiating with applying nations, therefore
accession to the agreement is generally favorable to the new member.
Accession of a new member country requires a two-thirds majority
vote by the Contracting Parties. In a sense this is contrary to the thrust of
the agreement since trade benefits are to be granted to all members.
Therefore, all members should have the right to vote on membership
applications. It was adopted, however, in the interests of preventing an
important trading country from blocking membership of a competing nation.
If a member does not agree to accession of a particular country, however, it
is not obliged to apply the provisions of Part II to that new member country.
In other words, membership does not necessarily involve a uniform tariff
system with respect to all participating countries. Japan's accession met
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with a great deal of opposition as she was regarded as a most dangerous trade
competitor owing to her low wage scales. A two-thirds majority was achieved
5in 1955, and then several countries did not apply the provisions of Part II.
There were twenty-three original Contracting Parties to the GATT in
1947, but by June 1970, seventy-seven full Contracting Parties had acceded
to the agreement, plus there is one provisional member. In thirteen
additional countries GATT rules are applied de facto even through those
countries are not official members. It is assumed that they will eventually
become full Contracting Parties.
Administration
The Contracting Parties agreed to meet from time to time for the
purpose of completing the details of those provisions which require joint
action. These meetings were to be called "sessions, " and in general would
be held once every calendar year. The first and third sessions were held
simultaneously with the first and second rounds of tariff negotiations. In
February 1970, the Contracting Parties held their twenty-sixth session.
During the third session, in 1949, it was decided that the Secretariat
of the Interim Commission of the International Trade Organization would
take over secretarial, administrative, and between session duties for the
GATT. In 1952, this body became the permanent Secretariat of The
Contracting Parties, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The
van Meerhaege, International Economic Institutions, pp. 160-161.
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Secretariat is headed by a Director General, until 19G5 the Executive
Secretary, whose role is at once administrative, yet powerful. The
Secretariat is divided into two main departments, those of Trade Policy and
Intelligence, and Conference Services, Liaison and Administration. There
are also the Information and Library Service and the Trade Information
Center, and seven specialized divisions under the two departments.
In 1955, at the ninth session, an attempt was made to create a permanent
administrative organization for GATT, the Organization for Trade Coopera-
tion (OTC). As discussed in Chapter III, this organization was never
ratified by the Congress and, therefore, was as good as dead. Its demise,
however, did not eliminate the need for a more permanent, professional
GATT nucleus.
As the GATT gained prominence and general acceptance, and as more
and more nations acceded to its provisions, the GATT organization, as
differentiated from the basic agreement itself, grew and became formalized.
At the sixteenth session, in 1960, the Contracting Parties decided to establish
a Council of Representatives, whose functions it would be to consider urgent
matters between sessions, to supervise the working of committees, and to
prepare for the sessions. The council is composed of representatives from
each of the Contracting Parties that wishes to be represented. The Council
Gerard Curzon, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy (London:
Michael Joseph, 1965), pp. 47-53.
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meets between sessions for periods of a few days.
In addition to the Secretariat and the Council, GATT business is
conducted by committees, working groups, and panels of experts, as needed.
Purpose, duration, and composition of these groups varies with the time
and circumstance.
The physical location of GATT permanent bodies, of all recent tariff
negotiations, and probably of all future negotiations, is the GATT International
Trade Center in Geneva. This center was instituted in 1964, and like all
GATT administrative expenses, its cost is born equitably among the Contract-
o
ing Parties, computed on the basis of each country's share of foreign trade.
Uniqueness
GATT is the only organization of its type in the world today. It is so,
in fact, because it is not really an organization per se, but rather it is the
basis for contractural arrangements among sovereign nations. The partici-
pating nations are even called "Contracting Parties."
Another startling feature of GATT that has been preserved since its
inception is that not one member country has ever ratified the agreement. It
exists by force of the "Protocol of Provisional Application. " The United
7 Ibid
. , pp. 41-42, & 52.
8Ibid.
,
p. 38; and Harvard Law Review , "Free Trade and Preferential
Tariffs: The Evolution in International Trade Regulation in GATT and
UNCTAD, " Volume 81, 1968, p. 1810.
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States participates in the negotiations and agrees to the subsequent trade
concessions under the authority vested in the President by the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1934. 9
Finally, the fact that GATT came into existence at all is rather unique.
It was not planned; it was not sought; and it was not widely acclaimed at the
time of its inception.
The original idea was that GATT was to protect the 1947 tariff
concessions from nullification or impairment until such time as the
International Trade Organization could take over. In fact had the ITO
come into existence contracting parties to GATT would have confined
their activities strictly to tariff matters. The six tariff negotiation
rounds and their administration would probably have constituted the
only activity of GATT. But the I. T. O. was not brought into existence
and hence contracting parties to GATT assumed many of the functions
and responsibilities which it would have undertaken. GATT thus
10became de facto if not de jure an international trade organization.
GATT Tariff Negotiations
The statutes described in Chapter III provided the Presidents with
tariff reducing powers. The vehicle by which these reductions were to be
brought about is the tariff negotiating conferences between the Contracting
Parties to the GATT. Just how well the United States responded to the
opportunities to reduce tariffs and other barriers will now be examined
round by round.
9Harvard Law Review, Volume 81, 1968, p. 1806.
Curzon, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy, p. 34.
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It should be borne in mind, when considering concessions received and
granted, that the hallmark of GATT negotiations is reciprocity: what can my
country receive from yours in turn for certain concessions? The whole basis
of the GATT structure is to apply concessions granted to one nation, to all
nations. If one gives up something, it should receive something in return
from all of its partners. But it is obvious that such a principle is difficult
to practice under all circumstances. The volume of a country's trade, the
average levels of its tariffs, its non-tariff barriers, and a host of other
factors enter into the reciprocity calculations, not the least of which is the
different treatment accorded different classes of goods, e. g. , industrial
vs. agricultural. But in order to make any kind of comparison of the success
of the negotiations at all, it is necessary to review the various concessions
granted and received. The important ingredient must be the knowledge that
true reciprocity does not always mean equal concessions.
Table 2
Table 2 is a summation of the major indices of tariff concessions agreed
to at each of the GATT rounds. It is provided at this point to afford an overall
view of the aggregate amounts of trade involved. Where these data are used
in the subsequent text separate notation as to source will not be made.
Figures may not agree precisely with those of Appendix A. No attempt
has been made to reconcile the differences since, for the most part, they



























T3 C to ri CO
CD
to -ri CD
CNI en O LO ^r O Cu tO
>
ri q 03 M








CD O 2 H"H t* » •V „ #* O -H •




CO CM 3; Pi
rQ CD X O 3 <0-
t/i OS JJ DO O CD (Li **





to (/) +J r-i
to •M o\° .
CD
<+i ^
LO to r~- r» >o vO T3 C •s
O o\c o °
Pi
. • • • • • O >H •M
3 r- rH LO > ri
o s r- i—
1
*3"
• •H ri O
u 1—
1
1/1 o o P.
r-> o +-> o
T3 to to VO o r^ to LO O r—
(
o +-> OS
CD £ a ^ \D LO i^ LO LO O 3 ri 03
ti c ^ o^ ^ r» CM "<* r-» r- LO O 1—
I
rS
c o O ^-"H ri •\ ^ •V i-H 13 •M
rt &^ < 2 i—i i—i CO 03 C CD CT.
fn E O <j$ O « rC i—
(
u M CO M
T3^>
t/1 r- to i—
i
o CO o +-> CD •- E
. +J r^ LO LO i—i t^- cr, •ri +-> 1/5 c3
CO rH r— VO o i—
i
LO o o C CD ri
. o •\ * » •> * i o 03 o OO
r- !
to CM CM LO o vO fn ri U o
X r—
1




^D CM i—( CTi to to CD c m
i—
i
r~- C7> cn to i—( i-H ri O rH 4->
o3 CM O LO CM o \D •H rH 3
•M •> •% *s N •\ •V U (/) 03 o
O CM r-» vO o LO 00 O to £
H
*e-





CD 00 Is*. 00 i—i r-l 00 o O Uh OO
CD
i—l
r- i—i o t^- r~- vO to o <
3 ,P
o3
00 en r-- LO 00 LO 3
cm o CD
r-i *» •V •i *\ *\
rt
•H CM CM rt 00 1—1 to O 3 T3
to > +J i-H o T3 o3








r~- -3- to r-~ CM LO •H M CJ
CD
CD
a> r-~ 00 vO *?r •^r -P 03 CD X
to i—i 00 vO i—i o 03 +J X 4->
ri
** •* •s «* •* •* M 3 •»->












43 i—t 1—1 \0 i—l CM +-> 03 +J
a3
9 # , a X ri OS
•H 00 T— I—
I
^t C7. CM DO M •*-> ri














<tf Cn en Tj- CT> 00 i—
I
10 3 3
• • • • • • o CD i-H O
*-* 00 oo LO O 1^- CM 3 03 •H








•HCD « CXi oo <Tt ^r O Tj-
T3 U to -3- ^r LO vO vO i-> rH JZ 3 S
cd rt
C7> CTi CTi cn CTi CT> a •»-> o E
fn CD <-H i—i r—l i-H v-H i—
1
cw ri o





,H r^ en i-H ^D CM h- ri •H
CM
CT3 -3" ^r LO LO vO ^o 03
CM tO ri cm
CD C7> en C7^ a>














vO vO ^ CD 3 o3
CD O -M O H
1 X rC 03 o |
CD 03 x 03 03 03 03 M rH C •
O i > o 3 > > > •ri DO CO
03 CD CD cr CD CD CD W 03 3 •
i—
(
c s fH £ c c +-> -3 •ri :=>
Qi CD 3 o CD CD CD c l/> CD (->








CD +-> 3 T3 •M -C rC ri ri O u
.0
i
«« O Jh u +-) 4-> Pi CD CD DO ai




H CD x: o •H •H a: H o3 3 o




The first round of tariff negotiations under the aegis of what was soon
to become the GATT was conducted simultaneously with the discussions
concerning the Charter for an International Trade Organization, from April
through October 1947. The agreements were negotiated on a bilateral,
selective, product-by-product basis, but were then placed in force multi-
laterally. Covering approximately 45, 000 separate items, $10 billion worth
of goods, and 70 per cent of the total world trade, 123 such reciprocal trade
agreements were reached. The GATT was signed by twenty-three nations
on October 30, 1947 to go into effect provisionally January 1, 1948.
The United States negotiated with all twenty-two other participating
countries. Agreements reached prior to 1947 were replaced by those
negotiated in the GATT. Concessions were granted by the United States on
articles constituting 70. 4 per cent of the total dutiable imports for
consumption in 1939. The average rate of duty on all dutiable imports in
effect in 1947 before Geneva was 32. 2 per cent (1939 levels). After the
GATT round the average was 25.4 per cent, a 21 per cent reduction. The
President's authority was, as we have seen, a reduction of up to 50 per cent
of the 1934 rates on any specific commodity.
The disparity between these figures and those of Appendix A is due
to the use of 1939 as a base year in the calculations here. Appendix A
figures are all "current year" based.
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Of the $2. 276 billion in imports, $879 was dutiable and $1. 397 billion
was duty-free. The Geneva negotiations resulted in tariff reductions on
imports amounting to $471 million; tariff bindings on imports amounting to
$148 million; and duty-free bindings on a very few new commodities, but
resubstantiation of the duty-free status of $1. 180 billion worth of trade
previously agreed upon. Of the $619 million in commodities upon which the
United States granted duty reductions or bindings, $124 million worth of goods
were granted reductions or bindings in rate of 10 per cent or less; $2 million
worth were granted reductions or bindings between 10 and 25 per cent; $167
million between 25 and 35 per cent, and $266 million worth of imports were
granted concessions in rate between 35 and 50 per cent.
In return for these concessions, the United States received concessions
on goods totalling $1. 302 billion in export trade in 1939 (to all countries, not
just those with which the agreements were negotiated). These were made up
as follows:
Binding of duty-free status: $305 million
Binding of tariff against increase: 359 million
Reduction in tariff rates: 500 million
Other commitments: 138 million-1-^
The "other" commitments consisted of obligations to remove numerous other
1
2
All statistical data in the above section were taken from: U.S. Tariff
Commission, Operation of the Trade Agreements Program June 1934 to
April 1948
,
Parti, Summary, pp. 15-39; and U.S., Department of State,
Analysis of General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, 1947.
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trade barriers, e. g. , empire preferences and various complicated
customs machineries.
The first round of negotiations within the GATT was to be the most
fruitful conducted until the Kennedy Round in 1964. In large measure this
was due to the novelty of multilateral negotiations and to the United States'
broad tariff reducing powers. Also, the mutual feelings of cooperation and
affiliation flowing from the recent successful conclusion of the war carried
with them a mood of optimism concerning the future of world trade potential.
It was a good beginning to reciprocal trade agreements. It pointed out,
however, how much slack there was in the world's trade posture, and how
much progress could be made if the effort was expended.
Annecy, 1949
The second round of GATT tariff negotiations was for the most part
simply an extension of the first round. Ten additional countries sought to
accede to the Agreement, requiring extensive negotiations. Also, the
authority granted the President to reduce tariffs had been extended by the
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1949, for another three years. Since
much of the original 50 per cent tariff reduction power was not yet expended,
United States' negotiators still had considerable latitude in bargaining.
1
S
J.M. Letiche, Reciprocal Trade Agreements in the World Economy
(Morningside Heights, New York: Kings Crown Press, 1948), p. 46.
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Negotiations were not conducted between any of the twenty-three original
Contracting Parties, which were all present again, but rather were held
only with and among the ten acceding parties. One hundred forty-seven
bilateral negotiations were concluded. The meeting was held in Annecy,
France, just south of Geneva, from April through August 1949.
Because of the nature of the Annecy meeting, the United States
concluded trade agreements with countries constituting only about 5 per cent
of the total imports for consumption in 1947 and 1948. Concessions were
granted through bilateral agreements on imports valued at $143 million;
however, because of the multilateral nature of such agreements, the total
import value covered by the concessions amounted to $250 million. Dutiable
products accounted for $65 million, and duty-free products $78 million, of
the imports that concessions were concluded on. Of the $65 million of
dutiable items, $61 million were involved in tariff reduction concessions, the
other $4 million worth of goods were duty-bound. Tariff reductions of
between 36 and 50 per cent were conceded on $39 million of the $61 million.
Prior to the Geneva and Annecy conferences the average ad valorem
equivalent of the tariffs on total U.S. imports was 28. 4 per cent (weighted by
the value of imports in 1947). On the same basis the average rates in effect
after Geneva was 15 per cent, and after Annecy 14. 5 per cent, an aggregate
reduction of 49 per cent from the pre-agreement rates. Before the conclusion
of any trade agreements, the duties on dutiable articles (again weighted by
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1947 values (the slight disparity between these figures and those of Appendix
A is due to this difference in the year of valuation of imports) were equal to
11.1 per cent of the total value of United States imports, free and dutiable.
After the Geneva negotiations the average decreased to 5.9 per cent, and
after Annecy to 5. 7 per cent.
There was a very wide range in the average rates of tariffs in the
various schedules before any trade agreements were concluded; from 12 to
92 per cent ad valorem (1949 import values). After the Annecy negotiations,
the average rate of duty varied less from schedule to schedule, and the range
was reduced to from 5 to 44 per cent ad valorem. Before any trade agree-
ments were concluded 20. 4 per cent of total United States imports were subject
to tariff rates higher than 40 per cent ad valorem, whereas after the Annecy
negotiations the proportion in that bracket was less than 4 per cent.
Concessions received by the United States at Annecy were on
commodities totalling $489 million in trade in 1948, or approximately 36
per cent of the total export trade to the ten countries involved. Concessions
reducing duties were applied to exports valued at $277 million; to bindings
of existing duties at $151 million; and to bindings of duty-free status to $52
million. On trade valued at just less than $9 million the commitments made
could not be classified, but covered such things as changes in tariff types
and schedules, and also increases in duties.
^Statistical data in Annecy section from: U.S. Tariff Commission,
Operation of the Trade Agreements Program , Third Report April 1949 -June
1950, pp. 4-11; and U.S., Department of State, Analysis of Protocol of
Accession and Schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade




Torquay, in the south of England, was the scene of the third round of
GATT tariff negotiations from September 1950 through April 1951. Torquay
marked the beginning of GATT as an organization involved in more than just
tariff negotiations, but also in the many real problems of world trade and
commerce. Part of the impetus for this expansion in scope was undoubtedly
the failure of the United States Congress to ratify the ITO Charter in 1950,
signalling the death of that organization.
The genesis for the expanded character of the meeting was a suggestion
by The Netherlands that the conference contribute in considerable degree to
the equilization of tariff levels within Europe. With the relaxation of quanti-
tative trade restrictions, in large part brought about by the signing of the
Agreement, low tariff countries, of which The Netherlands was one, were
being exploited to a large extent by the high tariff countries. The reduction
of tariff rates was not enough. A greater equilibrium between all tariff levels,
particularly on the Continent, was needed.
The discussions which followed were long, complicated, and at times
bitter. A plan was submitted by France for an across-the-board lowering of
customs duties by 30 per cent. There was also much discussion concerning
just what part the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)
would play in European tariff standardization. No satisfactory or lasting
solution to the problem was reached during the Torquay round, but one more
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step had been taken toward the eventual European Common Market (EEC). The
French plan eventually became known as "The GATT Plan, " and after some
hope for its adoption was achieved by the Benelux countries favorably
endorsing it, it met the fate of so many other far-sighted proposals, that of
death in the United States Congress. 5
In the meantime, tariff negotiations at Torquay resulted in a modest
amount of rate reductions, embodied in 147 bilateral agreements between
thirty-four countries, twenty-eight of which were Contracting Parties, and
six countries desiring to accede to the Agreement. An innovation incorporated
at Torquay was the use of tariff information and lists of the products on which
they intended to request concessions exchanged between the participating
countries the previous year. This had been brought about in the interest of
shortening the length of the tariff negotiation rounds.
The United States completed negotiations with seventeen countries at
Torquay, five of them newly acceding nations. Concessions were granted on
products which in 1949 accounted for $477 million worth of imports for
consumption from all countries. Of this total, $419 million worth of goods
were granted tariff reductions; $24 million tariff-bindings; and duty-free
bindings on $34 million worth of imports. The items upon which concessions
were granted accounted for only 7. 2 per cent of total imports for consumption.
Also, only 1325 of the approximately 2800 statistical classifications covered




by the lists of commodities were negotiated. The limited scope of the Torquay
round was due to the limited tariff bargaining power still remaining from the
Trade Extension Act of 1945. There were, however, several concessions
granted on goods that had not been previously included in any agreements. The
combined beneficial effect on the lowering of tariffs at the two previous rounds
can be seen in the analysis of percentage reductions of tariffs conceded at
Torquay. Of the $419 million of import goods upon which tariff reductions
were effected, $156 million worth were for reductions less than 25 per cent;
$104 million for reductions between 25 and 35 per cent; and $160 million
worth for reductions between 36 and 50 per cent.
Concessions which the United States obtained at Torquay consisted of
reductions of duties, bindings of existing duties, and duty-free bindings on a
wide range of products. They covered $1,060 billion worth of export goods to
the countries with which the United States completed the agreements, and
another $100 million worth of exports to countries which concluded other
agreements at Torquay. The third round of negotiations was the last at which
the United States received concessions on trade valued at more than that on
which it granted concessions.
Statistical data in Torquay section from: U.S. Tariff Commission,
Operation of the Trade Agreements Program
, Fourth Report July 19 50 -June
1951, pp. 66-74; and U.S., Department of State, Analysis of Torquay
Pro . col of Accession, Schedules and Related Documents, General






Attempts at tariff negotiating procedure reform continued through 1956,
largely within GATT, which was becoming a strong and independent organi-
zation as well as a concept, and within the OEEC. Little progress was made,
however, and a universal pessimism was building toward just how successful
any further GATT negotiations could be. When the President's tariff reducing
power was increased by only 15 per cent in 1955, this pessimism was at its
highest. Nevertheless, the five year search for a better formula for lowering
tariffs was not completely wasted. The many meetings and proposals within
the GATT framework contributed significantly toward the evolution of the
1
7
complete elimination of tariffs within the EEC.
Despite the pessimism, however, the fourth round of tariff negotiations
sponsored by the Contracting Parties, was held from January through May
1956. Unlike at the previous rounds, no additional countries were negotiating
to accede during 1956. (It should be mentioned, however, that in 1955 a
conference with the Contracting Parties was held in Geneva, devoted almost
entirely to the accession of Japan. Japan was present at Geneva in 1956.
)
Twenty-two countries participated in the conference, plus, for the first time,
the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community was present,
1 7Curzon, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy, p. 94.
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acting as agent for its six member nations. Sixty tracJo agreements were
reached.
Under existing United States legislation, as enacted in the Trade
Extension Act of 19 55, the maximum reduction that could be made in the
import duty on any commdity was 15 per cent, and the reduction was to be
spread out evenly over three years. The concessions that the United States
granted at Geneva consisted almost entirely of reductions of approximately
15 per cent in the existing rates of duty. Tariffs on 36 commodities for which
the existing ad valorem rates (or equivalent) were more than 50 per cent were
reduced to that figure, and one free-list item was bound at that status. The
United States granted tariff concessions to the countries of initial negotiation
on products that accounted for imports valued at $519 million (1954 value).
Imports of these products from other countries that participated at Geneva
were valued at $134 million. Total imports from all countries of products on
which concessions were granted were valued at $753 million. These figures
do not include copper. A concession—the reduction by approximately 15 per
cent of the import-excise taxes on unmanufactured copper and copper
products --was granted on copper subject to various technical qualifications
which were inapplicable at the time of the agreement. Therefore, copper is
not included in the above concession product totals. If it were, total imports
of concession products would be $911 million. The United States obtained
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concessions on $395 million worth of export items from the twenty-one
1
8
countries with which it concluded agreements.
At its conclusion, the 1956 tariff round was considered by many insiders
to be a failure. The results were modest, to be sure. However, the negotia-
tions did accomplish much when it is considered how little bargaining power
and new areas for tariff reductions the participants had to work with. The
major achievement, therefore, was the realization that a new method of
negotiation for tariff reductions was sorely needed. The bilateral, specific,
product-by-product bargaining sessions were not responsive enough to the
19
overall needs of the Contracting Parties.
The Dillon Round, 1960-1962
By the time the fifth tariff negotiation conference sponsored by the GATT
rolled around in 1960, many new situations had developed, and the negotiations
were, indeed, entering a new era. The fifth round had been suggested in 1958
by Mr. C. Douglas Dillon, then Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs,
and later Secretary of the Treasury. By 1960, the EEC had become a
1 o
Statistical data in Geneva section from: U.S. Tariff Commission,
Operation of the Trade Agreements Program
,
Ninth Report July 19 55 -June
1956, pp. 54-64; and U.S., Department of State, General Agreement on
Tariff and Trade Analysis of United States Negotiations Sixth Protocol
(Including Schedules) of Supplementary Concession Negotiated at Geneva,
Switzerland January-May 1956
.
yCurzon, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy, p. 97.
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functioning and powerful entity. Its high common tariff had created many-
tariff problems that would require negotiations to solve, plus outside
countries, not the least of which was the United States, saw a very real
threat to their markets posed by the EEC.
The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958 had granted the President
additional tariff reducing powers of up to 20 per cent. Mr. Dillon was
determined to use this authority, plus the influence of the non-EEC European
countries, to bring down the Common Market tariff. After much bickering
and behind-the scenes work in all of the concerned countries, it was decided
to hold the fifth round in Geneva, beginning in September 1960. The meeting
was divided into two phases. The first was devoted to renegotiation of various
concessions granted to GATT members at earlier rounds. The chief feature
of the first phase was the negotiations required to provide appropriate tariff
concessions in the common external duties of the EEC to replace concessions
granted previously by individual EEC members. Forty countries participated.
The second phase included both negotiations among Contracting Parties for new
or additional concessions, and negotiations between Contracting Parties and
countries desiring to accede to the Agreement. It is this latter phase which
is generally referred to as "The Dillon Round. " Twenty-eight countries
participated in that phase.
The first phase was particularly onerous due to the large disparity
between tariff rates in the "low tariff" EEC nations, specifically the Benelux
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countries, and the "high tariff" ones. The EEC sought to have accepted the
arithmetic mean of the tariffs involved. This problem took over nine months
of extremely hard work to resolve, but in the end GATT was established as a
"strong and reliable instrument where even such a powerful economic block
as the Six could be made to conform. " ° At the conclusion, many nations had
yielded a considerable bit of sovereignity over tariffs and trade to the GATT.
In the first phase negotiations, the United States first relinquished its
rights, as country of initial negotiation or as principal supplier, to old
concessions in the GATT schedules of the EEC members covering U.S. exports
to those countries of about $1. 5 billion. In place of these old concessions, the
EEC granted the United States concessions in the common external tariff
having a trade coverage of nearly $1. 7 billion.
The Dillon Round, which lasted from May 1961 (the end of phase one)
through July 1962, was again conducted on the bilateral, product-by-product
basis, leading once again to a pessimism amongst the attendees. The old
problems of politics, regionalism, and individual item protection, still
existed and boded ill for the success of tariff negotiations.
The revival came, however, and ironically it was due to the EEC, the
organization persons had considered to be the eventual downfall of the GATT.
The Common Market started the round by proposing a 20 per cent across-the-





a time when the United States Tariff Commission had provided their
negotiating team with peril points on most individual items well above the
20 per cent cut level, showed the absurdity of the old product-by-product
method. President Kennedy came to the rescue by releasing the peril point
provisions, and most of the 20 per cent reduction was achieved. The end of
the old methods had been signalled. "The machinery of the old Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act of 1934, regularly renewed since, was creaking. It
9 9
had been designed for a different world.
Of the twenty-seven countries that participated in the conference, the
United States completed negotiations with twenty-three of them in fifty-five
separate agreements. Concessions were granted on products whose imports
into the U.S. in 1960 were valued at $1. 755 billion. These were broken down
into $1. 665 billion of imports granted tariff reductions; $24 million duty-
bound; and $66 million were granted duty-free bindings. In return,
concessions were granted on exports amounting to $1. 564 billion worth of
23products to the twenty-three countries negotiated with.
21 Douglas, America in the Market Place, pp. 107-110.
22Curzon, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy
, p. 100.
^Statistical data on the Dillon Round from: U.S. Tariff Commission,
Operation of the Trade Agreements Program
, 14th Report July 19 60 -June
1962, pp. 1-23; and U.S., Department of State, General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade Analysis of United States Negotiations 1960-61 Conference
Geneva, Commercial Policy Series #186, 1962.

The Kennedy Round, 1964-1968
When he took office in 1961, President Kennedy already had his trade
expansion program in mind. In large part it was aimed at modernization of
GATT operations in order to effect the eventual liberalization of trade
across-the-board. In particular, he recognized the challenge presented by
the EEC, and was determined to provide machinery with which the United
States could meet that challenge. He anticipated the addition of seven more
countries to the EEC, and concluded that such a union would pose horrendous
trade problems for the U.S. As discussed in Chapter III, one of his major
programs was the liberalization of trade and the continued reduction of
barriers to foreign commerce.
While the Dillon Round was still in progress, the Trade Ministers of
Contracting Parties met in Geneva in November 1961 and declared:
(1) that reductions of tariff barriers in accordance with the terms of
the General Agreement should be continued;
(2) that consideration should be given to the adoption of new techniques,
in particular some form of linear tariff reduction; and
(3) that these new techniques should be examined as soon as possible
with a view to the early application of the recommendations resulting from
such an examination. ^4
In October 1962, a GATT committee was appointed to work out the details of
the procedures likely to be followed in the future.
In the meantime, the President's trade bill had been passed, and signed
24^Curzon, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy, p. 103.
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into law. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 was designed to meet the
challenge of the EEC head-on, and to provide American support for the
three goals outlined by the Trade Ministers. Although the Act never
specifically mentioned "linear" tariff reductions, it was clear that the
President intended to use his 50 per cent tariff reducing authority in several
ways. In preparing for the negotiating round, the United States representa-
tives, headed by Christian Herter until his death in December 1966 and then
by William M. Roth, considered all U.S. tariffs as susceptible to reduction
with a minimum of specified exceptions.
The linear bargaining formula was not without its hazards. The GATT
Ministers had set an across-the-board cut of 50 per cent as a "working
hypothesis." The application of this principle, however, would entail
detailed solutions to the problems of wide tariff disparities, agricultural
programs, exceptions to the reductions, non-tariff barriers, and to the
special problems of the less develoved countries (LDCsh In the end it was
decided that each country participating in the round would be labeled; linear,
special arrangement, less developed, or non-negotiating. Only fifteen
countries, including the United States, the EEC countries and Japan, were
included in the linear category. Thirty-one were either special or LDC, and
forty-one were non-negotiating. Even with this arrangement, the complica-
tions were tremendous. In the final analysis, the United States granted
concessions on imports for consumption totalling $8. 5 billion. Of that,
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concessions were made on $6. 4 billion worth of imports at a level of 50 per
cent or more, to the other fourteen linear countries.
The months leading up to commencement of the negotiations were
filled with problems, proposals, counter-proposals, and, for the most part,
non-solutions. The specific goals of the round could not be agreed upon;
what would be accepted as bare minimum for the linear cuts was the subject
of vigorous debate; and the rules of negotiation, particularly agreement on
tariff schedules, were debated at length. Moreover, the "chicken war"
erupted in July 1963, and for a while it appeared as if the entire round would
be wiped out because of the animosities created. In the end, however, after
preparations lasting from December 1962 right up to the opening of the
conference, the Kennedy Round officially got underway on May 4, 1964.
The major goals were: (1) to achieve a substantial liberalization of
world trade in industrial products; (2) to provide for acceptable conditions of
access to world markets for agricultural products; (3) to make an effective
contribution to the growth of the LDCs; and (4) to reduce non-tariff barriers.
In comparison to actual negotiations, the preparations for them were a
breeze. Fifty-four countries met from May 1964 through June 1967. Seven
of those countries were newly acceding to the Agreement. The meetings may
well have gone on for an even longer period of time if it had not been for the
pending expiration of the negotiating authority under the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962. The United States' authority to enter into trade agreements
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would expire on June 30, 1967. If negotiations were not complete then, the
entire five year struggle would have been for nought.
The round went through several phases, each marked by a major
crises or two. Trade and Aid arguments in the United States; De Gaulle's
threatened withdrawl of France from the EEC; specific agricultural
commodity problems, particularly the grains dispute; and many other
problems caused anxious moments and took many hours of painstaking
discussions to resolve. In early 19 67, faced with a rapidly approaching
deadline, the negotiators compromised on many problems and brought an
end, just in time for the United States to legally sign the agreements, to the
longest, most involved and largest in terms of trade involved, trade
negotiations ever conducted. The results are just about as complicated as
the negotiations themselves. Concessions were granted on trade valued at
close to $40 billion out of a world trade of approximately $180 billion.
The major accomplishments were considerably less than the
maximums achievable, but were significant and far-reaching. With respect
to its major goals, the Kennedy Round can be evaluated as follows:
1. The average reduction of tariff rates on industrial products was
36 to 39 per cent of all major industrial countries. About two-thirds of the
cuts were for 50 per cent or more, and steel and chemical tariffs were
stabilized much more than they had ever been previously. Only modest
reductions were accomplished in textiles. Machinery, transportation
equipment, and chemical tariffs were all reduced substantially.
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2. Agricultural results were far more mixed and generally less
successful. Substantial tariff cuts were achieved on a wide range of
products, but the special negotiations on grains, meats, and dairy products
were not generally successful. The broad question of conditions of access to
the world's markets remained unanswered. The agricultural sector remains
the largest single problem area in international trade, largely because of
national commitments to the domestic farmer. The problem is further
complicated by parity levels, subsidies, and aid programs. These areas were
discussed during the Kennedy Round but substantial solutions were not found.
3. A significant advance was made in the reduction of non-tariff
barriers. A major accomplishment was the acceptance of the Antidumping
(dumping is the practice of one nation flooding another's market with a specific
product priced substantially less than the fair market value, thereby causing
injury to domestic producers) Code. It contained many concessions by all
concerned, and brought many national policies into closer harmony. A major
feature of the Antidumping legislation was the United States agreement to seek,
in return for various concessions, repealing the American selling price (ASP)
method of valuation on certain chemical product tariffs. (The ASP has still
not been repealed and continues to be a primary complaint from our trading
partners. It is clearly in violation of the spirit and intent of the GATT.
)
4. The LDCs emerged from the round better off than when they
entered it, but not completely satisfied. The size of the average tariff
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reductions to products of particular interest to those countries was
approximately 30 per cent; substantial, but not as large as the average
25industrial cuts between the developed nations.
The United States made concessions on a total of $8. 5 billion of its
imports for consumption in 1964. Tariff reductions were made on $7.9
billion, or 64 per cent of dutiable imports from all sources. Tariff bindings
were made on $150 million of imports, and duty-free bindings on $400 million
worth. Of the $8.5 billion, $680 million was imports from LDCs participating
in the round. Of that amount, duty elimination was made on $350 million,
duty reductions (almost all of 50 per cent) on $300 million, and duty-bindings
of $30 million. About $610 million of the tariff concession imports were on
agricultural goods from participating countries. The average percentage
cut on nonagricultural tariffs on U.S. imports from the linear countries was
35 per cent. The average reduction from the linear countries on U.S.
exports was 34 per cent.
In return for the concessions it granted, the United States received
concessions on $8.1 billion worth of exports. Of this total, $7. 6 billion was
to the other major participants in the Kennedy Round. Six point seven
25For an in-depth analysis of the Kennedy Round, see: Preeg,
Traders and Diplomats. The above evaluations are found on pp. 256-260,
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billion dollars consisted of tariff reductions or elimination; $845 million of
duty-free bindings; and $69 million in tariff bindings.
The concessions granted by the United States at the Kennedy Round
were to be put into effect in five stages, the first on January 1, 1968, and
the fifth on January 1, 1972. These concessions covered more trade and
were of greater scope and size than any previous rounds. Although many
critics have called the round a failure, because of its length and many
unforeseen obstacles, and lack of 50 per cent across-the-board tariff
reductions, the scope of the round was such that it is, without a doubt, one
of the most, if not the single most, important events in the world's trade
history.
Summary
The Trade Agreements Program has carried this country from high
tariff status to low tariffs in thirty-six years. In 1931, when the Smoot-
Hawley Tariffs took effect, the average ad valorem equivalent tariff rate on
dutiable imports for consumption was 53. 2 per cent. In 1970 it was 10.
per cent. Even more significant, however, is the increase in the proportion
"Statistical data on the Kennedy Round from: U.S., Tariff
Commission, Operation of the Trade Agreements Program , 19th Report
1967, TC Publication 287; and U.S., Office of the Special Representative
for Trade Negotiations, General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, 1964-67
Trade Conference Geneva, Switzerland, Report on United States Negotiations
,
Volume I, pp. i-xii.
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of total imports for consumption that dutiable imports have made. In 1931,
33.4 per cent of the total imports were dutiable, contrasted to 65. 1 per cent
in 1970. The implication is that it became increasingly cheaper to import
dutiable commodities because of the ever decreasing duties.
That the GATT has been a major contributor to this liberalization,
there can be no doubt. It is questionalbe whether or not the old machinery of
of bilateral negotiations could ever have reached the point we are at today,
not to mention doing so in twenty-three years. From the U.S. perspective,
the first and sixth rounds of GATT tariff negotiations were by far the most
fruitful. At the first round the United States granted concessions on 77. 5
per cent of its imports for consumption; at the sixth round 45. 6 per cent.
(See Table 2, page 73.) However, as mentioned in Chapter I, comparisons
of this nature are not always meaningful. The important fact is that in each
case the United States was able to lead in the quest for world trade
expansion and liberalization, and largely through its efforts, has brought
about substantial reductions in trade restrictions.
We have discussed, in Chapter III, what our trade programs and
policies have been, and, in Chapter IV, the means by which we sought trade
liberalization. It is now in order to examine our trade history with
individual areas of the world. The effect our programs and policies have




TRADING PARTNERS AND TRADE LEVELS
General Discussion
The United States accounts for approximately 20 per cent of total
world imports. It has eighty separate trade agreements in force, and
imports from over 130 individual countries. Of the total imports in 1969,
however, 73. 1 per cent came from only twelve of those trading partners.
Sixty-four point four per cent of the total came from six of those twelve.
General imports (merchandise entered immediately upon arrival into
merchandising or consumption channels, plus commodities entered into
bonded warehouse storage—as compared to imports for consumption) in 1969
from all sources were $36,043 billion. Our six leading trade partners
supplied $22. 228 billion; the next six another $4. 136 billion. Similarly, the
United States exported a total of $38,006 billion in 1969 (includes reexports
of foreign produced merchandise as well as domestic products), $25. 653
billion of it to the same twelve major partners.
The economic and trade implications of our policies, programs, and
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trade levels, whether they are increasing or declining in relation to the
total market, will give fair indication of the direction those policies have
aimed. This chapter will examine, in broad generalities, the effects that
those policies have had on trade with our major trading partners, plus two
specialized "groups" of trade partners that occupy a significant portion of
our attention. In this way, it is hoped, the overall effect of our trade
programs will be in evidence. It is recognized that this review will not
cover 100 per cent of our world trade. It will, however, cover the bulk of
that trade in both economic and political terms. It is believed that this can
be done by studying our trade with Canada, Japan, the six countries of the
European Economic Community (EEC), the United Kingdom, the conglomerate
categorization of Less Developed Countries (LDCs), and the Communist
Nations.
In choosing the above six trading partners, it was recognized that two
important trade blocs were not included. These are the countries of Central
and South America, and those of the European Free Trade Association. The
countries of Central and South America, almost to a nation, are also
classified as LDCs, and therefore policy towards them will be reviewed in
that section. Also, even though Mexico and Brazil are among the top twelve
trading partners, there is little in the way of trade policy that effects them
or their Latin American neighbors, that does not also effect our trade with
Europe or Canada, and will be covered in those sections. EI^TA is not
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covered in detail because its only significant feature is a common internal
tariff, and each individual country's external tariffs are the subject of
bilateral negotiation and individual assignment.
The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to put all that has been
reviewed before into some kind of perspective: to analyze what has happened
as a result of the Presidential programs, legislative actions, trade
agreements, and tariff negotiations that have taken place since 1945.
Canada
Our neighbor to the north shares with us the longest unpatrolled
national boundary in the world. She also shares with us the largest single
trading partnership in the world. The 1946 to 1950 average yearly
Canadian exports to the United States was $1. 424 billion. In 1969 it was
$10. 383. Twenty-nine per cent of our 1969 imports came from, and 24 per
cent of our exports went to, Canada. The United States' share of total
Canadian imports was 73 per cent. Seventy-one per cent of her exports
came to this country. The most important imports, in terms of dollars,
from Canada are lumber, newsprint, wood pulp, cars and trucks, machinery,
and petroleum products. In return, we send Canada machinery, chemicals,
U.S. , Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce and Navigation,




electrical apparatus, and large transport equipment, as well as a host of
2
other commodities of all classes.
The most important legislation specifically concerning U.S. -Canadian
trade was the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965. As mentioned in
Chapter III, this act removed all tariffs on Canadian automobiles and
automobile parts. These tariffs had been between 6. 5 and 8. 5 per cent. In
return for the passage of this act, and the U.S. automakers agreements to
manufacture more of their cars in Canada, the Canadian tariff on U.S.
autos was abolished. These two tariff eliminations were agreed to under
the exceptions to the most-favored-nation clause of the GATT at the
Kennedy Round. In 1964, the year before the agreement, trade in auto-
motive products between Canada and the U.S. was $730 million, $654
million of which were U.S. exports. In 1965 the corresponding figures were
$1. 1 billion and $860 million; in 1966, $2. 1 billion and $1.3 billion. This
immense increase in automotive trade between the two countries was
3
undoubtedly at least partially due to the elimination of tariffs.
Considerable progress was made between the two countries at the
Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations. The U.S. granted Canada $1. 403
billion (1964 levels) in duty reduction concessions, and $1. 2 million
2 U.S., Department of Commerce, Overseas Business Reports , OBR
70-74 December 1970, "United States Trade With Major Trading Partners
1965-1969, " Table 5, pp. 11-15.




duty-free bindings. In return, Canada granted the U.S. $1. 257 billion in
duty reductions, $4.5 million in duty bindings and $181 million in duty-free
bindings. A significant feature of these negotiations was that the U.S.
added $480 million of Canadian imports to the duty-free list, in return for
about $100 million worth of the same type concessions; however, the
Canadian concessions were on generally higher tariff rate articles.
Japan
The trade relationship between Japan and the United States is at once
volatile, yet large and growing larger. It is volatile, as evidenced by the
textile agreements controversy mentioned in Chapter I. It is the second
largest trading partnership the United States has now, and the rate at which
that trade increased during the ten years from 1960 to 1970 was faster than
any of the other trade partnerships we have. In 1969 the U.S. accounted for
27 per cent of Japan's imports, $3,490 billion, and received 31 per cent of
her exports, $4,888 billion. These figures are startling when it is
remembered that our trade with Japan was zero in 1944, and that she did not
accede to the GATT until 1955. Her average 1951-1955 imports from the
United States were only $255 million worth of exports to the U.S. In 1960
4 1964-67 Trade Conference Geneva, Switzerland, Report on United
States Negotiations, Volume I, pp. 20-25.
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the trade level was: $1. 341 billion worth of U.S. exports to Japan; and
$1. 126 worth of imports from her.
In 1963 Congress passed, and President Kennedy signed, a bill
permitting subsidies to U.S. mills to buy cotton at the world price. The
act was aimed, in part, at Japanese competition. In 1967, Congress
considered a bill to require investigation of low -wage imports damage to
U.S. industries that was directed right at Japanese imports. The portions
of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act and the pending 1971 Trade Bill that
provide protection in the form of quotas and subsidies to the domestic
textile industry are directed right at Japanese competition. The 1967 bill
did not pass the Senate, and it is yet to be seen if the 1971 version will, and
if it does, if the textile protections will be left in. In any event, it is clear
that much United States effort has gone into attempts at blunting the
Japanese competition.
This is not to say that U.S. -Japanese trade cooperation has been
lacking. The concessions granted each other at the Kennedy Round were
considerable. The U.S. granted concessions on imports for consumption
valued at $1. 176 billion (1964 levels), consisting of $886 million in duty
reductions and $290 million in duty-free bindings. Six hundred and nine
million dollars of those tariff reductions were at the 50 per cent level. In
5Overseas Business Reports, OBR 70-74, Table 9, pp. 26-29.
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return, Japan granted $1,463 billion in concessions; $1,457 of it in duty
reductions, $952 million of which were for 50 per cent.
It is certain that United States -Japanese trade will continue to grow
as will their economies. The textile issue now flaring up may give rise to
some temporary setbacks and animosity, but the two markets are too
dependent upon one another and too well established not to flourish. Besides
textile and clothing, the United States imports large quantities of automo-
biles, machinery, iron and steel-mill products, electrical and electronic
equipment, and, of course, the famous Japanese transistor radios, TVs,
and recording equipment. In return, Japan buys large amounts of food and
beverages, lumber, iron and steel scrap, soybeans, coal, and sophisticated
machinery. Japan is the largest single market for U.S. agricultural
exports. These markets will remain and most likely continue to grow:
"Neither the United States nor Japan can afford to lose each others'
market. '
The EEC
Trade with the six Western European nations which make up the EEC
and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), in other words The
1964-67 Trade Conference Report on United States Negotiations
,
Volume I, pp. 34-37.
7Alfred K. Ho, The Far East in World Trade (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, Publishers, 1967), p. 217.

104
Common Market, is conducted on an individual, nation-by-nation basis.
There is no trade with the EEC, as such. However, since all six of the
countries involved (Belgium and Luxembourg are usually treated as one)
are among the twelve top trading partners of the United States, and since
laws and regulations applying to one generally affect all of the others, and
since the EEC applies a common external tariff as well as internal free-
trade, this section will deal with trade between the U.S. and the EEC as
a single economic entity. When viewed this way, the EEC comprises the
second largest trading partner of the United States. In 1969, U.S. imports
from the six EEC countries totalled $5. 798 billion, and exports were $7,005
billion. Table 3 provides a breakdown of these figures into individual
country trade levels.
Individually, West Germany ranks as the third largest trade partner
of the United States, Italy the sixth, France the seventh, Netherlands eighth,
and Belgium -Luxembourg tenth. Total trade figures with these nations in
1969 are somewhat staggering when compared with 1951-1955 levels. During
that period, U.S. imports averaged $995 million, and exports $1,882
billion. 8
The primary events concerned with U.S. -EEC trade have to do with
the EEC's gradual conversion tea duty-free union beginning in 1957, and




being completed in July 1968, and the rest of the world's response to that
conversion. Much has been written about the EEC's overt and undisguised
discrimination in trade with external countries. This is partly due to
protectionism fostered in order to promote intra-market trade, and also
partly due to a series of "preferential treatments" offered various trading
partners. These preferential arrangements are between one or more of the
EEC countries and various trading partners or regional blocs, usually
deriving from previous colonial association or proximity to the EEC. As a
whole, the EEC's external tariffs on non- agricultural products are low, and
cause little problems in trade with the United States.
Agriculture is the largest source of friction the EEC has with external
trading partners, as indeed it is among the six partners themselves. The
chicken war exemplified these problems, as did the complicated bargaining
and negotiations leading to the World Grains Arrangement. For example,
during the Kennedy Round, the EEC made concessions on only $238 million
of U.S. agricultural exports, or 27 per cent of the U.S. trade available for
concessions. In return, and in order to receive even that level of trade
concessions, the U.S. granted concessions on $122 million of agricultural
imports from the Common Market, or 60 per cent of the entire total of that
trade. 10
Douglas, America in the Market Place
, pp. 122-124; and, Operation
of the Trade Agreements Program, 19th Report, p. 118.
125.
Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 19th Report, pp. 121-
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Nevertheless, progress has been made on all fronts, and the trend of
trade indicates it will continue to be made. If the EFTA countries (Austria,
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and
the U.K.) ever are able to integrate into the EEC, U.S. imports from the
Common Market would be increased by approximately 60 per cent. As it is,
the EEC represents the largest trading bloc in the world, and United States
trade policy must continue to seek reduced restrictions and increased
markets with it. Of course, the ideal solution would be the creation of one,
integrated Atlantic free-trade area, compromising the EEC, EFTA, the
United States and Canada. At present, however, such an arrangement
seems far off, so our efforts must be continued toward negotiations of the
Kennedy Round type.
The United Kingdom
Not a great deal needs to be said about the United States trade with
England, other than that it has increased steadily since the war. In 1969 we
imported $2. 120 billion in goods from the U.K. , as compared to the 1946-
1950 average of $240 million. After the war, the U.K. was our fifth
largest supplier of goods, and in 1969 the fourth largest. Exports to the
U.K. have also increased markedly, rising from a 1946-1950 average of
11 Bela Balassa, "American Attitudes Toward Trade Liberalization in
the Atlantic Area, " in Changing Patterns in Foreign Trade and Payments , ed.




$765 million to $2. 335 billion in 1969. Although the balance is still in favor
of American exports, the gap has closed considerably, due primarily to
the liberalizing effect of our tariff reducing policies. The United States
supplied 14 per cent of all U.K. imports in 1969, and received 6 per cent of
1
2
our imports from her.
Much of the U.S. -U.K. trade discussion over the years has concerned
various preferential treatments the U.K. has always granted Commonwealth
countries --the Commonwealth Preference Area (CPA). These arrangements
are within the rules of the GATT, but still they cause disharmony. For
example, during the Kennedy Round, the CPA nations exerted great pressure
on the U. K. to maintain its tariff levels on tobacco and soybeans imported
from other than CPA sources, thereby providing the Commonwealth a
decided advantage over the United States as well as other countries.
Concessions were finally made to the U.S. on soybeans, but tobacco tariffs
1 o
remained as they were.
Less Developed Countries
Much has been written in recent years concerning the "third world" of
emerging nations. In the fields of economics and trade, these, as well as
1
2
Foreign Commerce and Navigation
,
Table 6, p. 21 and Table 11,
p. 35; and Overseas Business Reports , OBR 70-74, Table 12, pp. 36-38.
1
3
1964-67 Trade Conference Report on United States Negotiations
,
Volume I, p. 46.
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some of the long established sovereign states, are referred to as LDCs.
Their problems are immense and crying for solutions. Just which countries
make up the LDCs, however, is subject to interpretation. As decided by the
GATT at the Kennedy Round, LDCs would be designated on the basis of per
capita income, but in certain marginal cases that criteria does not always
provide an accurate determination. For example, Yugoslavia and Israel
normally consider themselves LDCs, but clearly are in the middle bracket
14in per capita income. In general, however, all the countries of the world
except the United States, Canada, those of Western Europe, Japan,
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the centrally planned economies
of Eastern Europe, theU.S.S.R., China, and Eastern Asia, are considered
LDCs. These would include most African nations, almost all Central and
South American countries, and most of the island nations of the world, as
1
5
well as all the rest of the nations of Asia.
Because of the diverse nature of these countries, it would be inaccurate
to say that the United States has one trade policy with respect to the LDCs.
In general, however, the U.S. has attempted some methods of trade
liberalization designed specifically to open new markets and expand
opportunities for the LDCs. For example, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 19th Report,
pp. 172-173.
15Michael Zammit Cutajar and Alison Franks, The Less Developed
Countries in World Trade (London: The Overseas Development Institute
Ltd., 1967), pp. 27-28.
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contained certain authorities for the President to remove duties on
agricultural and forestry products of those nations, providing U.S.
production of the same products was not damaged significantly. (This
action met with little success, however, since the "no significant damage"
clause, as might have been expected, proved too difficult to administer.
)
Also, the U.S. leadership in concluding the International Grains Arrange-
ment and, to a very large degree, GATT itself, was instrumental in
improving the trade position of the LDCs. Conversely, however, most
agreements and arrangements the U.S. has entered into, which will
eventually stabilize LDC trade and income, have been entered for purely
selfish economic reasons; e.g., The International Sugar and Coffee Agree-
ments. Also, the U.S. agricultural program is full of parity pricing and
subsidy granting to farmers growing many of the products the LDCs depend
so heavily upon for their international trade, tobacco, cotton, vegetable oils,
and nuts are examples.
In general, the proportion of U.S. trade with the LDCs to total U.S.
trade has been decreasing in recent years, even though the absolute level of
U.S. -LDC trade has been increasing slightly. In 1960, 32 per cent of all
U.S. exports went to LDCs and 40 per cent of our imports came from them.
1 R
Cutajar and Franks, The Less Developed Countries in World Trade
,




In 1965 these percentages were 31 per cent and 32 per cent respectively,
and in 1969, 29 and 28 per cent. 17
Mexico, the largest single trading partner generally classified as an
LDC, shipped an approximately constant 60 to 65 per cent of its total
exports to the United States throughout the 1960-1970 period. Her imports
from the United States declined in proportion to total imports, from 69 per
cent in 1964 to 62 per cent in 1969. 18
Trade with Cuba, another Western Hemisphere LDC, plummeted after
the revolution in 1959. After the war Cuba was our fourth largest trading
partner, receiving an average of $409 million worth of our exports and
sending us an average of $399 million of imports during the period 1946-
1950. In 1965 imports from Cuba had trickled to $9, 000 worth, and exports
were $5, 000. 19
Imports from several of the other major LDCs, such as India, Brazil,
Colombia, and Malaysia, while being important in terms of size, have
remained fairly constant since the war, or have increased slightly. Exports
to those countries have generally increased on the order of two-fold during




18Overseas Business Reports , OBR 71-009, Table 14, p. 24.




1967 because of the sale of wheat and other grains to her, but then returned
20
to a normal level for the past three years.
The only non-possession preferential trade agreement the U.S. has in
force is with the Philippines. In 1946 Congress passed The Philippine Trade
Act. It was revised in 1955. Essentially it calls for preferential tariff
treatment between the two countries until 1974. Principal products
concerned are Philippine sugar, cordage, tobacco, and cigars. After 1974
the tariffs on these products, and all others between the two nations, will
equalize with all other like tariffs in force, having been increasing at an
21
agreed upon rate since the signing of the agreement. U.S. -Philippine
trade has risen slightly since the war. Imports from the Philippines
averaged $174 million from 1946 to 1950, while exports averaged $377
million. In 1969 imports were $423 million and exports $374 million.
A proper summation of our trade policy towards the LDCs could
probably be termed "benign neglect. " While we have cooperated with all of
the efforts to assist in their development, and have even led in some, and
have offered trade relief wherever it did not threaten "significant damage"
to domestic industries, we have put forward very little in the way of positive,
forceful actions. President Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress" with Latin
20Overseas Business Reports
,
OBR 71-009, Table 11, p. 20.




America was the type of program sorely needed by all of the LDCs.
Unfortunately, the Alliance has run into major problems before its
beneficial effects could be fully realized and long before trade could take the
place of aid. In the meantime, we continue our policies of treating all trade
partners as equals, giving unto them in proportion to what they can give unto
us, and the proportion the LDCs can give, and therefore receive, continues
to decline with respect to the rest of the world.
The Communists
The subject "trading with the Communists" is almost as diverse as
that of trade with the LDCs. In it is included trade with the U. S. S. R.
,
Eastern Europe, China, and the East Asian Communist nations. In many
respects, Cuba and the U. A.R. could also be considered in the same
classification, but since they both fit into the LDC category easily, this
section will deal only with the areas mentioned.
Although the three major Communist regions can be lumped together
for certain discussions, the history of United States trade with them, and
the regulations governing trade with them are, separate. They will be
divided for purposes of this discussion.
Trade with China was large and vigorous during and just after the war.
Exports to her amounted to an average $244 million from 1946 through 1950,
with imports from her averaging $112 million during the same period.
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Nineteen forty-nine was the year of the Communist takeover and trade began
to diminish rapidly, until by 1952 it was less than one million dollars per
year. (These figures take into account only direct trade with Communist
China. Until 1964, a substantial trade, about $3.6 million per year, existed
with Outer Mongolia, and there has always been the problem of bootleg
Chinese goods through the port of Hong Kong. ) The U.S. embargo on trade
with China was enacted in 1950, and in 1951 the UN also placed a total
embargo on all trade with China. The pattern of our trade with the other
Communist countries of East Asia, namely North Korea, North Vietnam,
Inner Mongolia, etc. , is essentially similar to that of trade with China.
Once the Communists took over it was just a matter of time before trade
became essentially zero.
Trade with Eastern Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, East Germany after 1948, Hungary, Poland
and Rumania- -Yugoslavia is generally not considered in the Communist
trading region, having followed an independent course since 1949) has
followed a somewhat erratic pattern since the end of the war. With the
commencement of the cold war, trade declined slowly until a low was
reached in 1952. It then began a steady, but gradual, rise until 1965, when
it dipped sharply, probably due to animosities caused by Vietnam, but has
risen again since then. Exports to Eastern Eruope have been: an average
of $134 million from 1946 through 1950; an average of $87 million from 1950
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through 1955; $154 million in 1960; $94 million in 1965; and $233 in 1969.
In the same years, our imports from those nations have been: $27 million;
$47 million; $57 million; $96 million; and, $144 million. During the entire
post-war period, U.S. imports from Poland, mostly in ham and sausage,
have constituted well over half of the total.
Trade between the United States and the U. S. S. R. has been a story of
its own. It will suffice here to relate gross totals and basic events that
have governed those totals. U.S. -U. S. S. R. trade followed essentially the
same pattern as that for U.S. -Eastern European trade. Exports to Russia,
after the $10 billion lend-lease arrangements during the war were : an
average of $110 million from 1946 through 1950; essentially zero in 1952;
$38 million in 1960; $145 million in 1964; $45 million in 1965; and $106
million in 1969. Imports from the U.S.S.R. were: $68 million; zero; $22
million; $20 million; $43 million; and $52 million. 22
The major statutes that regulate trade with the Communists are: the
Export Control Act of 1949 which empowers the President to bar or limit
exports to further foreign policy or national security interests, or to cope
with domestic shortages or inflation; the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act
which empowers the President to regulate all transactions between
Americans and foreigners during time of war or declared national
Statistics for the entire section from: Foreign Commerce and
Navigation, Tables 6 and 11; and Overseas Business Reports, OBR 71-009,
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emergency; and the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the
Battle Act) which prohibits U.S. aid to any country shipping arms to the
Communist bloc. In 1950 the United States imposed total embargoes on
trade with Communist China, Manchuria, North Korea, and Inner Mongolia,
in 1954 on North Vietnam, and in 1960 on Cuba, under the Trading with the
Enemy Act and Export Control Act. The export of arms, strategic and
critical materials to the U. S.S.R., Outer Mongolia, and Eastern Europe
was forbidden beginning in 1949 under the Export Control Act. In 1951 the
controls were tightened under the Battle Act.
The major exception to the embargo on trade with the U. S. S. R. and
Eastern Europe has been agricultural products, particularly wheat. With
the poor crops of 1963 compounding their general agricultural problems,
these countries were desparately in need of wheat and other grains in 1964.
Sixty-three million bushels of U.S. surplus wheat was sold to Russia, and
consequently, exports to the country show a large peak in that year.
Another exception to the general rule of little or no trade with the
Communists has been Poland. The United States has attempted to encourage
and expand trade with Poland, just as it has with Yugoslavia, hoping to
foster an independence from the U. S.S.R.
In 1965 President Johnson attempted to seek ways to liberalize all
trade with the U. S. S. R. and Eastern Europe. He established an advisory
committee to study means of expanding this trade. The group brought forth
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proposals that the Administration eventually put into the East-West Trade
Relations Act, which essentially would have given the President authority
to extend favorable tariff treatment to Eastern European countries and the
U. S.S. R. if he thought it would be in the national interest. The bill was
sent to Congress in 1966, but it never came to the floor of the Senate.
Mr. Johnson's final attempt to "build bridges" with those Communist
countries was a bill to help the Export-Import Bank finance an Italian auto
venture in the U. S. S. R. Once again Congress blocked the measure, and
23
the deal was eventually made through different channels.
Summary
United States foreign trade has expanded greatly since World War II.
Some trading partners have changed, but others have remained major
importers and exporters of U.S. goods. Referring to Appendix A, we see
that U.S. imports for consumption grew from $4,098 billion in 1945, or a
total equal to 1. 93 per cent of our GNP, to $34. 768 billion in 1970,
equivalent to 4. 1 per cent of the GNP. This would seem to indicate a very
definite, if slow, upward trend in the importance of imports in our economy.
At the same time exports have risen, but not nearly so dramatically. The
23Congressional Quarterly Service
, Congress and the Nation, 1965-
1968, pp. 64 and 96-97.
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world, greatly dependent on U.S. products after the war, consumed $10,309
billion worth of them in 1945. In 1970, U.S. domestic exports were $42,593
billion. Perhaps this closing of the (X-M) gap can be atrributed to a
liberalized foreign trade policy.
The figure in the last column of Appendix A, that of "ratio in per cent
of imports for consumption to output component of GNP" is an interesting
one. It too seems to suggest a very definite upward trend, increasing from
3.18 in 1945 to 8.4 in 1970.
Another statistical method of examining our degree of trade liberali-
zation is that of "average ad valorem equivalent tariff rates on imports for
consumption. " This hypothetical figure ostensibly measures a country's
average duty level. Ours has dropped from the all-time high in 1932 of 59. 1
per cent, to 29. per cent in 1945, and to an all-time low of 10 per cent in
1970. The immeasurable quantity, and one of great importance, is just how
much non-tariff barriers have replaced the tariff as the primary restriction
to imports while this seemingly liberal tariff reduction period was in
progress ?
We have now covered the history of our trade policies and legislation;
of our trade agreements program; and of our trade with major trading
partners and areas. This completes the historical portion of this paper. It
is now time to draw some conclusions, and to speculate just a bit into the




Free Trade vs Protectionism
That there has been progress during the past twenty-five years toward
the reduction of United States tariffs and trade barriers there can be no
doubt. This country, from all historical evidence, has been the leader in
seeking expanded world trade, lower tariffs, vast markets for every
country's goods, and broadened opportunities for all nations, rich or poor.
The question really comes down, then, to whether or not we have done
enough; or, recognizing the term "enough" as idealistic and non-quantifiable,
perhaps the more pragmatic question would be, have we done all we could?
As demonstrated in Chapter II, the roots of our trade liberalization go
back to the depression. The name that stands out above all others in the
annals of foreign trade expansion and liberalization must be that of Cordell
Hull. The beginning was in 1934. The Trade Agreements Act was the most
significant foreign trade legislation in American history. Once that was a




and improvements. From 1945 through 1970, the period in question, the
fruits of that act were realized. It was improved upon in 1945, 1955, 1958,
and in 1962 an even more liberal law was passed. Also, its influence was
transmitted world-wide in 1947 when the GATT was signed.
The foreign trade achievements of the administrations in office over
the past twenty-five year period can only be considered mixed, at best.
Presidents Truman and Kennedy receive the highest grades. Truman for
his successful sponsorship of the Extension Act of 1945, the Geneva
Conference of 1947, the GATT that resulted, and the second round negotia-
tions in 1949. Kennedy 8 s Trade Expansion Act is the second most important
trade legislation in American history, not only for its considerable liberality,
but also because it will undoubtedly be the model for future trade bills for
many years to come. The round of GATT negotiations which bear his name
must surely be credited in large part to his initiative, leadership, and
perserverance.
Presidents Eisenhower and Johnson can be given As for effort, but
little more. The status quo was held during their administrations. Perhaps
that is enough when one considers the strong protectionist sentiment they
encountered during their times.
President Nixon probably rates the lowest grades of all. It is far too
early to judge him, but from what we have seen, free trade advocates will
probably consider themselves fortunate if at the end of his Presidency no
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stringent protectionist measure has been passed. In his favor it must be
admitted that protectionist sentiment is rampant, both in the Congress and
in industry. A good deal of this is caused by the economic downturn of recent
recent years. But it is hard to ignore the fact that the proposed 1969 Trade
Bill, by its provision for mandatory quotas on all imports and significant
reductions in textile quotas, encouraged many of the protectionist industries
and led to a "follow -the-leader" assault on low tariffs and high quotas.
A significant fact which is apparent throughout Chapter III is that,
despite what the President wants or proposes, the really protectionist body
in this country is the Congress. The House probably more so than the
Senate, but at times the Senate has been the stumbling block to liberal trade
legislation. Perhaps all this is as it should be. The Congress is elected by
the people who in turn work at jobs in industries that must compete with
foreign goods as well as with each other. It is understandably difficult to
ask a Congressman to vote for a measure that would have the effect of
lowering the price of shoes or clothing a few pennies for all the nation, when
it would also put some of his constituency out of shoe factory or textile mill
jobs. It can only be hoped that enough constituencies are not effected by
each bill that the majority of Representatives will favor the overall lower
prices. Which leads to a discussion of just why so many Congressmen,
whose districts are not effected by a particular quota or tariff bill will vote
for it anyway. The conclusion can only be that politics govern foreign trade.
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Despite our idealism and all of our rationalization about the benefits of
expanded trade being passed out to everyone, the entire issue boils down to
just what is politically expedient and what isn't.
Lobbying, probably more than any other, is the most American of our
political professions. Our lobbyists on Capitol Hill are a formidable force
in all issues of the day, but trade policy is one of their most consistent
targets. It is easy to see, by the number of quota bills, the strong anti-
liberal debates, the "education" campaigns, etc., that industry (protectionist)
forces are well organized, specific-issue oriented, and well financed. On the
other side, those who would advocate and foster free trade, the economists,
academicians, consumer groups, and international-minded businessmen, are
poorly organized and factionated. They have little, if any, political power
or combined influence. It is a wonder we've come as far as we have.
Despite the odds, however, there are many facts that support the
contention that we've pursued free trade policies since the war. As discussed
in the preceeding chapters, the most important of these are:
• Tariff reductions, through the authority of the trade bills and the
medium of the GATT, have been significant. The average ad valorem
equivalent rate of duty on dutiable items has declined from 29 per cent in
1945 to 10 per cent in 1970. How much of this is due to inflation is rather
immaterial in the face of the primary fact of a decline in the rates of duty.
• Imports have played an increasing role in our daily lives, rising
from an equivalent of 1. 93 per cent of the GNP to 4. 1 per cent.
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• Imports have increased at a much greater rate than have exports
(a fact which gives rise to other problems which are without the scope of
this paper), 970 per cent to 413 per cent.
• Dutiable imports have increased in proportion to total imports,
38. 6 per cent to 65. 1 per cent, indicating a definite easing of import
restrictions and lowering of tariffs.
• Customs procedures have been streamlined and simplified.
• United States leadership has been significant and constant in
GATT and other international organizations fostering expanded world trade
and the betterment of life on a world scale.
• Our eighty trade agreements in effect have all resulted in some
specific lowering of tariff or non-tariff barriers.
• Trade with Canada has been cleared of the majority of tariffs
and barriers. If all of our trade were as free as that with our neighbor to
the north, we would be nearly to the point of true free trade.
• Participation in, and sometimes leadership of, the various
international commodity agreements (wheat, coffee, tin, sugar, etc. ), while
not always being as liberal to the producing nations as it could be, has
served to stabilize these markets and insure against severe losses in the
case of poor crop years.
Conversely, there are facts that indicate a not so liberal trade attitude.
The most important of these are:
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• The failure of the United States Congress to ratify the charters
of the two proposed world trade organizations, ITO and OTC.
• The increasing use of non-tariff barriers. The most important
of these are parities, subsidies, and some embargoes on agricultural goods,
and the low quotas on textiles, petroleum products, iron and steel, lead,
zinc, and many other products.
• The embargoed Communist trade.
• The repeated debate in the Congress whenever a liberal trade
measure is submitted, and the just as predictable pattern of quota bills every
time one industry gets some minor preferential treatment.
• The lack of a truly openhanded and consistent policy of trade
expansion with the Less Developed Countries. This is one area that the
United States can justly be accused of watching the dollars instead of the
heartstrings.
The facts have been reviewed. The question now is, simply, "free
trade" or "protectionism"? The answer cannot be that simple. Yes, the
Presidents have attempted to lead the country toward expanded trade, lower
tariffs, and zero non-tariff barriers. But Congress, that great protector of
the people, has continually showed a protectionist bent. The best answer
would probably be the hedged one of: "yes, we have followed a freer trade
advocacy since World War II, but we have not taken the necessary steps to
reach total free trade, and it is not likely that we will do so in the future.




The trade bill presently being considered in the House Ways and Means
Committee is similar to the one passed by the House in the 91st Congress,
but stalled in the Senate and finally shelved. It contains the same quota
restrictions for textile imports and retention of the American Selling Price
system of evaluation of certain tariff levels. It seems likely that, as
occured last year, all of the protectionist industries and their supporters in
Congress will attempt to gain similar favors for their products. A
concession to one almost always signals the rest to come running.
Just what Chairman Mills has in mind for trade policy is hard to
determine. His past record has definitely been one of liberalism. He has
been a strong supporter, and at times an originator, of liberal trade
measures. His turnabout on the 1970 bill was an enigma. It is interesting
to speculate whether or not this change of direction was a very neat bit of
reverse psychology on his part. Knowing that the Nixon Trade Bill was
protectionist, but only to a limited extent, his whole-hearted support of the
measure, and its quotas, opened the flood-gates for all of the protectionist
legislation simmering just below the surface for years to come splashing to
the surface. The sum total of all these restrictions was bound to be defeated
after long and bitter controversy. Perhaps, and of course this is pure
speculation, that is exactly what the Chairman had in mind all along.
In any event, it is certain that some form of trade bill will pass the
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92nd Congress. If, as if very possible, several new quotas are included,
for example shoes, oils, and chemicals, it is certain to spark retaliatory
measures by Japan, the EEC, and perhaps many other parts of the world.
It is extremely unlikely that any new tariff reductions will be negotiated
during Nixon's presidency. For, as he said, "we cannot anticipate in the
near future another big round of reductions. " At present he has no
reduction authority, the last granted by Congress having expired in June
1967.
In the meantime, from a free trader's point-of-view, there is much
that needs to be done.
First, and probably most important in the wake of the Kennedy Round
tariff reductions, is the growing problem of non-tariff barriers. The nature
of the barriers and the wide differences in their implementation make an
international agreement, under the auspices of GATT, increasingly
necessary and urgent. It is time effective controls be placed on all forms of
non-tariff restrictions before they have completely taken the place of tariffs,
and perhaps even enlarged upon tariff restrictions.
Agricultural problems are next in priority. We must work toward
solutions to the many diverse problems of agricultural embargoes, quotas,
parity and subsidy programs, and increased domestic farm aid, on an
international basis. Much of the needed help for the LDCs would be
automatically extended if agricultural problems in world trade could be
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solved. In this sector reform begins at home, but the need for it certainly
is not restricted to the United States. Again, negotiations are needed.
The third major problem is that of freeing up export markets. While
the United States has perhaps not done all it could to liberalize trade, in
comparison to some of the other nations it is a giant in the field. Japan,
for one example, maintains business and governmental policies prejudicial
to the expansion of foreign investment or world trade. President Johnson
said: "we are willing to give them competitive access to our market, asking
only that they do the same for us. " We must persuade our trading partners
that comparative advantage works for them as well as for us.
Fourthly, trade with the Communists must be expanded. Although it
is recognizably difficult to trade evenly between an enterprise system and a
state system, solutions to differences can be found. There is too much at
stake, politically, economically, and socially, to continue the disastrous
policies of the past. Economic intercourse may prove to be the one sure
way of easing world tensions.
Finally, the United States should immediately pursue expanded trade,
perhaps even free trade, with Central and South America. It's time we
stopped exploiting our neighbors by the "easiest path" policy of benign
neglect. There is no reason why we can not show hemispheric preferences.
We have nothing to lose, and a lot to gain. The recent elections in Chile are
a harbinger of the trend. If our politics can't change this trend, our trade
should be given the chance.
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These things are but the top few of what this writer considers to be
priority areas necessary if we are to continue our leadership role in the
expansion of trade and the eventual acceptance of world-wide free trade.
Unfortunately, I can see no possibility of these programs being actively
pursued in the near future. It seems the United States under the present
administration is going to be content to sit back on its free trade laurels of
the past twenty-five years and allow an era of consolidation, yes, and
protectionism, to settle in. We need another Hull, Truman, or Kennedy in
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